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Abstract 
In my thesis I examine the illicit fur trade in New France between 1663 and 1740, 
focusing on the relationship between illicit trade and colonial governance. I argue that 
French illicit fur traders (coureurs de bois) undermined New France governance by 
subverting licensed trade, which was crucial to France's economic, diplomatic, and military 
policies in North America. 
In chapter one I argue that government agents were forced to relax criminal 
penalties and New France trade regulations due to the close relationships that coureurs de 
bois had to the people who lived in and maintained the colony. Colonial administrators 
could not easily displace the illicit trade, as the French North American population 
sometimes relied upon the significant economic and diplomatic boons that coureurs de bois 
provided. 
Throughout chapter two I explore how colonial officials such as Intendant 
Duchesneau and Governor Frontenac often disagreed over the most effective ways to 
govern New France. More specifically, I contend that the primary cause for rivalries 
between New France officials was disagreements about how coureurs de bois should be 
handled, and how illicit trade in New France should be reduced. 
Finally, in chapter three I focus on Fort Frontenac as a case study of administrative 
interactions and the problems created by the illicit fur trade. In this chapter I argue that 
Fort Frontenac’s status as a royal fort and the suspect behaviour of its operators 
demonstrate that the problems created by the illicit fur trade – common support for 
coureurs de bois and administrative disunity – were real. 
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Introduction 
The Sun King’s ministers grew increasingly concerned about the problem of illicit 
trade in New France’s hinterland through the latter half of the seventeenth century. Since 
New France’s transition to becoming a royal colony in 1663, illicit fur traders – coureurs de 
bois – had been smuggling contraband to English and Dutch merchants in exchange for 
goods and profit. They were removing precious northern furs from New France and 
therefore taking money out of the pockets of hard-working habitants and voyageurs, as well 
as depriving the French state the economic boon of North American furs.1 Dutch and 
English traders made coureurs de bois (runners of the woods) rich, but their earnings were 
typically not devoted to furthering France’s colonial agenda.2  Intendant Jacques 
Duchesneau knew more than anyone that something had to be done about the illicit fur 
trade. Duchesneau had received a missive from Versailles that blamed him for the colony’s 
failings, and ordered him to curtail illicit trade and manage coureurs de bois.3 The fur trade 
was one of the colony’s greatest contributions to the French Empire, as it brought goods 
and wealth to places such as Montreal and Quebec, and provided a productive outlet for 
young men unenthusiastic about other colonial pursuits, such as agriculture.4 Animal furs 
from North America were highly-prized commodities valued throughout Europe.5 At the 
same time, however, the fur trade was also problematic for the colony, as New France had 
                                                          
1 LAC, Série C11A, Correspondance générale; Canada, R11577-4-2-F, “Lettre du roi à Duchesneau – le tient en 
partie,” 1680, 214. 
2 Claiborne A. Skinner, The Upper Country: French Enterprise in the Colonial Great Lakes (Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2008), 17. 
3 LAC, Série C11A, Correspondance générale; Canada, R11577-4-2-F, “Lettre du roi à Duchesneau – le tient en 
partie,” 1680, 213. 
4 Louise Dechêne, Habitants and Merchants in Seventeenth Century Montreal trans. Liana Vardi (Montreal & 
Kingston, London, Buffalo: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1992), 21. 
5 Ann M. Carlos and Frank D. Lewis, Commerce by a Frozen Sea: Native Americans and the European Fur Trade 
(Philadelphia and Oxford: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010), 16-17. 
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increasingly become over-reliant on the trade. New France’s reliance on fur trade earnings, 
and the diplomatic alliances with Indigenous nations that the fur trade afforded, meant that 
efficient, lucrative, and lawful trading was crucial to the colony. Prior attempts to abolish 
illicit trade had been unsuccessful, but Intendant Duchesneau knew that to satisfy his 
King’s demands, he would need a new strategy to deal with this clandestine trade and the 
“runners of the woods” that operated within it.6 
 The challenge facing Duchesneau to effectively administer the Laurentian colony 
elicits further investigation into New France, the fur trade, and illicit trading. It was not 
uncommon for Intendants in New France to receive direct royal instruction, but it is not 
readily evident if colonial officials and their counterparts in France more commonly 
cooperated or disagreed.7  The North American fur trade was crucial to French imperialism 
in North America, and coureurs de bois interacted with this economy through their illicit 
activity. Fur trading was considered illicit if it was conducted without a trade license 
(congé), or if it involved Frenchmen trading with English or Dutch merchants. The license 
system was meant to curb the proliferation of trade by limiting how many colonists could 
legally trade, as the fur trade pulled young men away from the St. Lawrence colony, and 
detracted from Minister Colbert’s vision for New France. Coureurs de bois traded furs 
independently and relatively freely with Indigenous, English, and Dutch merchants, but 
surely that cannot be all that defined them.8 These reflections prompted my final research 
question: did the illicit fur trade alter or influence the way that colonial and imperial 
                                                          
6 Eugene Richard Henry Tesdahl, “The Price of Empire: Smuggling Between New York and New France, 1700-
1754,” (PhD diss., University of Colorado, 2012, ProQuest), 50; Eric Jay Dolin, Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The 
Epic History of the Fur Trade in America (New York and London: W. W. Norton & Company, 2010), 96. 
7 Peter Moogk, La Nouvelle France: The Making of French Canada – A Cultural History (East Lansing: Michigan 
State University Press, 2000), 60. 
8 Skinner, The Upper Country, 17. 
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administrators governed New France, and if so, how? This study sits at the intersection of 
colonial political and commercial history, and therefore contributes to the scholarship and 
greater understanding of colonial politics and economies. 
The geographical and chronological context of New France between 1663 and 1740 
is fundamental to understanding the illicit fur trade’s influence on colonial governance. In 
1663, New France became a royal colony, after which it underwent some crucial changes.9 
La Compagnie de la Nouvelle France had governed New France since the seventeenth 
century, but King Louis XIV and his finance minister Jean-Baptiste Colbert lost confidence 
in company administration due to the company’s inability to contend with the ever-present 
threat of Iroquois aggression, and frequent colonial mismanagement.10 Beginning in 1663, 
New France became a royal colony under the authority of a Governor General. This 
Governor was appointed by the King and answered to the Minister of Marine at 
Versailles.11 In New France, the Governor handled issues such as colonial defence and 
protection. The Intendant and Sovereign Council oversaw civil matters such as colonial 
justice. There were some areas of jurisdictional overlap between the Governor General and 
the Intendant, each with their own political agendas. As a result, the colonial government 
often became mired down in administrative contention between competing officials.12 The 
endpoint of 1740 was ultimately chosen because it marks the beginning of the War of the 
Austrian Succession, and as a global conflict it required extensive resources and manpower, 
which forced French administrators to ignore smaller-scale issues such as the illicit fur 
                                                          
9 Ibid., 11. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Kenneth J. Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713-
1763 (Montreal & Kingston, London, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002), 22. 
12 W. J. Eccles, Frontenac: The Courtier Governor (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Ltd., 1959), 1-6. 
  4  
 
trade. Additionally, as historians Christian Crouch and Louise Dechêne argue, hard 
separations cannot be made between the intermittent colonial conflicts in the eighteenth 
century. Crouch even suggests that the War of the Austrian Succession influenced the 
attitudes of French marines, officers, and Indigenous warriors prior to the Seven Years’ 
War and the fall of New France.13 The period of 1663-1740 is therefore useful to study New 
France governance and the illicit fur trade because the dates themselves are significant, 
and the substantial length of the period provides a large source sample size. 
Minister Colbert believed that colonial success depended on stable commerce and 
agriculture. He envisioned a subsistence-based agricultural settler society leading to New 
France’s economic self-sufficiency.14 An economically independent colony could contribute 
to a lucrative triangle trade with France’s Atlantic colonies in the Caribbean and Africa.15 
To a young French habitant (peasant farmer), however, the canoe, musket, and profits of 
the fur trade were at least as attractive as the hoe, rake, and corn of the farm. The fur trade 
depleted the colonial population by pulling a portion of colonists away from their farms 
and communities along the St. Lawrence; Colbert’s dream was never fully realized.16 
Historian Leslie Choquette argues that French emigrants expected to establish themselves 
abroad and live comfortably away from France, and migration numbers to New France may 
have initially looked promising. Unfortunately for Colbert, cold winters, harsh conditions, 
and stories of “les sauvages,” combined with lackluster settler recruitment in France, 
                                                          
13 Christian Crouch, Nobility Lost: French and Canadian Martial Cultures, Indians, and the End of New France 
(New York: Cornell University Press, 2014), 6.  
14 Leslie Choquette, De Français à paysans: Modernité et tradition dans le peuplement du Canada français 
(Paris: Septentrion, Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 1997), 5; Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea, 
24. 
15 Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea, 25. 
16 Dechêne, Habitants and Merchants, xvii, 21; Skinner, The Upper Country, 18. 
  5  
 
ultimately kept immigration to New France small-scale.17 Historian Yves Landry argues 
that those who ended up in Quebec did not even choose their destination, rather they were 
soldiers or missionaries following orders, hired workers (engagés), or prisoners.18 An 
unexpected benefit of these relatively dire New World circumstances, however, was that 
these conditions quickly coalesced with European traditions; historian Louise Dechêne 
argues that those who left France “…were probably of harder mettle than those who bowed 
to difficult circumstances and stayed.”19 French settlers intermarried with Indigenous 
peoples, culturally mixing these two groups (métissage), and made New France’s colonial 
population particularly diverse.20 As Indigenous peoples vastly outnumbered the French in 
North America, French officials often had to concede to Indigenous diplomatic 
requirements, further complicating the character of New France.21 Indigenous peoples such 
as Algonquian-speakers of the Great Lakes region and the Iroquoian-speaking Huron-
Wendat typically practiced “gift-diplomacy.” In these systems, French diplomats were 
obligated to provide goods in exchange for peaceful relations and military assistance.22 
Therefore, although colonial officials were grounded in old world diplomatic practices, they 
                                                          
17 Leslie Choquette, De Français à paysans, 4; Peter Moogk, “Reluctant Exiles: Emigrants from France in 
Canada before 1760,” The William and Mary Quarterly 46, no. 3 (1989): 464. “Les sauvages” was the name the 
French gave the Indigenous peoples of North America. It generally means “Wild People of the Forests,” and 
was originally tied to North European folklore rather than hostility or malice. See: Moogk, La Nouvelle France, 
17-18. 
18 Yves Landry, “Les Français passés au Canada avant 1760: Le regard de l’émigrant,” Revue d’histoire de 
l’Amérique française 59, no. 4 (2006): 483. 
19 Dechêne, Habitants and Merchants, 46. 
20 Gilles Havard, Empire et métissages: Indiens et Français dans le Pays d’en haut 1660-1715 (Paris: 
Septentrion, Presses de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 17, 44-45, 31. Métissage is defined as an 
interbreeding of peoples enacted through cultural exchanges. The result of métissage is a culture that is both a 
mixture of the originals, as well as something new altogether. 
21 Havard, Empire et métissages, 16; Catherine Desbarats and Thomas Wien, “Introduction: La Nouvelle-
France et l’Atlantique” Revue d’Histoire de L’Amérique Française 64.3, no. 4 (2011): 14. 
22 Michael McDonnell, “Maintaining a Balance of Power: Michilimackinac, the Anishinaabe Odawa, and the 
Anglo-Indian War of 1763,” Early American Studies 13, no. 1 (2015): 40. 
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were forced to adapt to New France’s distinct character based on fur trade relationships 
and novel French-Indigenous alliance building. 
In the seventeenth century, newcomers to the easternmost edges of North America 
quickly realized the value of the area’s extensive cod fishery. French fishermen established 
themselves on the Acadian coast but pushed inward in search of additional natural 
resources. This migration into the interior brought French explorers into contact with 
Indigenous groups bearing goods, such as furs, with which to trade.23 French traders 
quickly discovered the high quality of North American beaver fur, and furs rapidly became 
a premier commodity of New France.24 France’s imperial hold on the continent was initially 
tenuous, which complicated the discovery of this newfound commodity and the trade 
relations it required. Although New France’s transition to a royal colony in 1663 brought 
greater organization, its borders remained ill-defined and contested for much of the 
colonial period.25 The colonial administration had to rely on and foster the relationships 
made with Indigenous peoples through trade.26 Trade with Indigenous peoples was not 
only economic in nature, but also helped create strategic alliances, which allowed the 
French to better protect their imperial interests and defend loosely defined colonial 
borders.27  
Military security was a constant problem for French administrators in New France. 
Conflicts such as the seventeenth-century Iroquois Wars proved to French authorities that 
                                                          
23 M. Brook Taylor ed., Canadian History: A Reader’s Guide vol. 1, Beginnings to Confederation (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1994), 58. See also: Dolin, Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic History of the Fur 
Trade in America, 10. 
24 Dolin, Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic History of the Fur Trade in America, 22. 
25 Desbarats and Wien, “Introduction: La Nouvelle-France et l’Atlantique,” 8. 
26 Ibid., 7. 
27 Moogk, La Nouvelle France, 14. 
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New France’s Indigenous allies were essential for the security of the colony and its 
inhabitants.28 These same authorities also saw that the fur trade promoted the spread of 
French power and territorial growth on the continent, and they relished its ability to 
disrupt Anglo-American settler expansion into the interior.29 The fur trade needed military 
support, however, otherwise French merchants and traders could be edged out by rival 
European or Indigenous competition. Minister Colbert and his successors wanted New 
France to pay for itself, and provided limited state-sponsored military support for the 
colony prior to the Seven Years’ War.30 The fur trade was crucial then for not just 
commerce but also for military security, as it contributed to the maintenance of military 
alliances with Indigenous peoples.31  
The fur trade’s strategic and imperial importance meant that the illicit fur trade was 
a problem for the colonial government. It was characterized by the smuggling of goods and 
furs away from French Imperial centres, such as Quebec and Montreal. These goods and 
furs were covertly moved to the commercial centres of competing empires such as British-
controlled Albany.32 The most recognizable actors in the illicit fur trade were coureurs de 
                                                          
28 Thomas Wien, “Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760: The Uses of Fur-Trade 
Imperialism” Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 1, no. 1 (1990): 296; Gilles Havard, The Great 
Peace of Montreal of 1701: French-Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century trans. Phyllis Aronoff and 
Howard Scott (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 32. Havard states that “[w]ith 
their tradition as warriors, the Great Lakes nations . . . contributed decisively to the weakening of the Iroquois 
Confederacy. In this effort, they constituted an auxiliary force that became essential to New France in the 
intercolonial rivalries of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.” 
29 Catherine Desbarats, “France in North America: The Net Burden of Empire During the First Half of the 
Eighteenth Century” French History 11, no. 1 (1997): 27-28. The strategic value of New France was its ability 
to quell the spread of Anglo-Americans into the North American interior. This helped to hinder Great Britain’s 
ability to exploit North America’s natural resource wealth. By encouraging fort construction and interior 
exploration, the fur trade helped to push French authority into the continent. 
30 Although the official military presence in New France may have been small, Louise Dechêne argues that a 
portion of male immigrants to the colony did have a martial background. See: Dechêne, Habitants and 
Merchants, 17-19. 
31 Wien, “Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760,” 295. 
32 Tesdahl, “The Price of Empire: Smuggling Between New York and New France,” 50. 
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bois, or “runners of the woods.”33 They traded between places like Montreal and Albany, 
exchanging high-quality furs found in the interior for choice English goods.34 American 
historian Claiborne A. Skinner argues that the independent spirit of coureurs de bois was 
rooted in French notions of liberty, that a free man should be able to go where he pleases.35 
Skinner’s notion is problematic, however, as it generalizes understandings of French 
freedom and liberty and links them to unruly behaviour. Skinner’s sentiment also implies 
that the average French person had a mind towards liberty over one hundred years before 
the French Revolution. In a similar vein, late historian and ardent anglophile Bernard 
DeVoto said a coureur de bois was “an Indian with a white man’s mind.”36 The bias here 
should be obvious, but again DeVoto provides an overly simplistic view of the French, 
North American Indigenous peoples, and coureurs de bois in Anglo-centric literature. What 
we do know, however, is that these supposed “wild men of the woods” shrewdly and 
effectively worked together with Indigenous hunters and trappers to establish a lucrative 
clandestine trade network throughout North America. Aboriginal transgressors of New 
France and New York law often went unprosecuted, allowing them to easily smuggle goods 
across imperial borders.37 Illicit fur traders substantially expanded contraband smuggling 
in New France because they could easily evade capture at the hands of colonial authorities, 
had extensive knowledge of the frontier, and were motivated by significant economic 
earnings from a black-market trade. 
                                                          
33 Dolin, Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic History of the Fur Trade in America, 96. 
34 Tesdahl, “The Price of Empire: Smuggling Between New York and New France,” 50. 
35 Skinner, The Upper Country, 17. 
36 Bernard DeVoto, The Course of Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1998), 103. 
37 Tesdahl, “The Price of Empire: Smuggling Between New York and New France,” 60. Jan Grabowski, “French 
Criminal Justice and Indians in Montreal, 1670-1760” Ethnohistory 43, no. 3 (1996): 405. Mohawk Iroquois 
were especially prolific smugglers of goods between Montreal and Albany. 
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The success of illicit fur traders is interesting enough to prompt a lengthy 
examination of the clandestine trade. Yet throughout my research I was confronted with a 
recurring question: did the illicit fur trade alter or influence colonial governance, and if so, 
how? Not everything that coureurs de bois did was clandestine, but the very nature of their 
vocation was covert. They are useful in gaining a more complete picture of peripheral 
peoples, and the role that geography plays in criminal activity; for instance, the pays d’en 
haut (Upper Country), the vast territory west of Montreal that encompassed the entirety of 
the Great Lakes region, helped coureurs de bois evade state control.38 To begin to 
understand the illicit fur trade’s impact on colonial governance in New France, however, it 
is first essential to understand governance in the imperial metropolitan centre – France. 
Beginning with the coronation of King Louis XIV and lasting until the French Revolution, 
France was ruled by an absolute monarchy. Louis XIV was the embodiment of this political 
system of governance.39 His authority stemmed from “the divine right of Kings,” and he 
lived by the mantra of Roman emperors, “si veut le Roi, si veut la loi” – the King’s will is 
law.40 Although the King relied on administrative support from numerous state officials 
and the cooperation of the state elite, under absolute monarchy, the power of the state was 
intended to rest in the King’s person.41 In New France, both the Intendant and Governor 
were representatives of the King, but the scope of their responsibilities and their physical 
                                                          
38 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 3, 5, 20; Havard, Empire et métissages, 17, 31, 44-45, 31; M. Brook 
Taylor, ed., Canadian History: A Reader’s Guide, 59. The limits of the pays d’en haut corresponded to the limits 
of the Franco-Indigenous alliance system. For the French, it was a region of remote wilderness. For tens of 
thousands of Indigenous peoples, it was their cultural, political, and economic centre. 
39 Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea, 22. 
40 Moogk, La Nouvelle France, 54. 
41 K. A. Stanbridge, “England, France and their North American Colonies: An Analysis of Absolutist State 
Power in Europe and in the New World,” Journal of Historical Sociology 10, no. 1 (1997): 37-38; Banks, 
Chasing Empire across the Sea, 22. 
  10  
 
distance from the French Court meant that they often had to make administrative decisions 
on their own. Furthermore, they typically reported to the Minister of the Marine, rather 
than to the King directly, which created greater distance between their administration and 
the King’s will. Without direct rule from the King himself, or at least detailed and frequent 
directives from the King, problems such as the illicit fur trade lacked clear and unified 
solutions. This thesis argues that the illicit fur trade frequently compelled colonial and 
imperial officials to rely less on stringent regulatory policies to manage clandestine trade, 
and that governance in New France took on a unique, somewhat weaker character as a 
result. 
The following chapters support this argument. I will provide evidence of the 
uncertain nature of governance in New France, and argue that because of governmental 
weakness, illicit trade could occur relatively easily.42 In his work, The Politics of Piracy, 
Douglas R. Burgess Jr. argues that English pirates were afforded a measure of freedom and 
agency to operate unimpeded, as their illegal activities often provided economic 
advantages to Anglo-American colonies.43 Similarly, I argue that administrative 
punishments against coureurs de bois were sometimes withheld as coureurs de bois 
benefitted New France economically and diplomatically through their trade and the 
Indigenous relationships that they fostered. Habitants and merchants also permitted 
coureurs de bois activity by continuing to conduct business with illicit traders regardless of 
their illegal ventures. Finally, I argue that colonial officials had to adapt, compromise, and 
cooperate with illicit traders because coureurs de bois were not easily apprehended, and 
                                                          
42 Desbarats and Wien, “Introduction: La Nouvelle-France et l’Atlantique,” 14. 
43 Douglas R. Burgess, Jr., The Politics of Piracy: Crime and Civil Disobedience in Colonial America (New 
Hampshire: University Press of New England, 2014), 17-21, 36-37. 
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the illicit fur trade sometimes helped New France diplomacy, particularly with Indigenous 
nations. In chapter one I discuss the place of coureurs de bois in the colonial sphere. I argue 
that government agents were forced to relax criminal penalties and New France trade 
regulations due to the close relationships that coureurs de bois had to the people who lived 
in and maintained the colony. Coureurs de bois had connections with not only Indigenous 
peoples, but also habitants, voyageurs, urban merchants, garrison soldiers, and even 
members of the administration itself. Colonial administrators could not easily displace the 
illicit trade, as the French North American population sometimes relied upon the 
significant economic and diplomatic boons that coureurs de bois provided. This 
compromised the ability of Governors and Intendants to quell illicit trade, maintain colonial 
control, and corral coureurs de bois.  
Chapter two examines the rampant administrative rivalries that sprung up between 
1663 and 1740. I argue that colonial officials such as Intendant Jacques Duchesneau and 
Governor Louis de Buade, Comte de Frontenac often disagreed over the most effective 
ways to govern New France. More specifically, I contend that the primary cause for rivalries 
between New France officials was disagreements about how coureurs de bois should be 
handled, and how illicit trade in New France should be reduced. Finally, in chapter three I 
examine Fort Frontenac as a case study of administrative interactions and the problems 
created by the illicit fur trade. Throughout its history, Fort Frontenac was operated by a 
variety of administrators with varying degrees of competence and compliance. It was also 
located amid illicit fur trading activity, and its operators were often accused of harboring 
and trading with coureurs de bois. In this final chapter I argue that Fort Frontenac’s status 
as a royal fort and the suspect behaviour of its operators demonstrate that the problems 
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created by the illicit fur trade – common support for coureurs de bois and administrative 
disunity – were real. 
Throughout my thesis, I use textual analysis to understand and interpret the 
writings of colonial officials in New France, and the King’s ministers in France. Textual 
analyses look at what people say to each other to gain meaning from their words. 
Educational psychologist Jessica Nina Lester argues that “...language is presumed to always 
be constructing something through its very construction.”44 Applying this to textual 
analysis means that there must be an interaction between subjective experiences or 
expressions, and objective realities. In the case of written correspondences between 
colonial officials and their counterparts across the Atlantic, textual analysis serves to 
uncover differing, sometimes contrary, aims and goals for governance of New France. 
Turning again to our story of Intendant Duchesneau, we see the value of official 
correspondences in arguing for administrative division in the face of the illicit fur trade 
problem. In his 1680 letter to Duchesneau, King Louis XIV accused the Intendant of not 
sufficiently following Governor Frontenac’s plans for New France. The plans that Frontenac 
supposedly had for New France included a stringent abatement of illicit trade, 
advancement of immigration and colonization, and cultivation of the land. King Louis XIV at 
least suggested that he had full confidence in the efficacy of his Governor in 1680, and 
blamed Duchesneau for the colony’s failings and for the continued proliferation of illicit 
trade.45  
                                                          
44 Jessica Nina Lester, “Introduction: Discursive Psychology: Methodology and Applications,” Qualitative 
Psychology 1, no. 2 (2014): 141. 
45 LAC, Série C11A, Correspondance générale; Canada, R11577-4-2-F, “Lettre du roi à Duchesneau – le tient en 
partie,” 1680, 213. One plan that Duchesneau was apparently not following: preventing the continuation and 
proliferation of the illicit fur trade and the actions of coureurs de bois. 
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Structuralism is also used throughout my thesis as a methodological underpinning 
to my arguments. A structural study is one that distinguishes the elements of a system, and 
then focuses on and examines these elements in the context of a broad network of 
relationships. For example, a structuralist philosophy of given cultural phenomena would 
be more concerned with the entirety of what makes up said phenomena, rather than the 
individual parts.46 For a structuralist analysis, the individual elements of a study should 
inform an argument of general applicability or relevance to the larger system.47 More 
specifically, a structuralist approach argues that the particular units in phenomena are 
solely defined by the “network of relations” they are a part of.48 I apply this structuralist 
approach to the administrative documents written about coureurs de bois to gain a more 
comprehensive understanding of official opinions about, and strategies concerning, these 
illegal traders. For example, a royal ordinance in 1684 implored colonial authorities to 
ensure that French traders brought their furs to Quebec or Montreal, rather than smuggle 
them to English Hudson’s Bay. 49 A structuralist approach places this somewhat ordinary 
edict in the larger context of French power and authority in the North American interior, 
and informs France’s struggle for greater political influence in the colonial ‘New World.’50  
The geopolitical context of New France provides the background to this thesis, and I 
have therefore endeavoured to establish New France as a colonial and imperial space using 
works on New France history. Early histories of New France typically make the argument 
                                                          
46 John Rutherford, “Structuralism,” Sociological Review 25 (1977): 44. 
47 Rutherford, “Structuralism,” 44-45. 
48 Kanavillil Rajagopalan, “Structuralism,” in Routledge Encyclopedia of Linguistics ed. Philipp Strasny 
(London: Routledge, 2005). 
49 LAC, Série C11A, Correspondance Générale, R11577-4-2-F, 297, “Ordonnance royale portant que tous ceux 
qui feront le commerce,” April 10, 1684. 
50 David Pace, “Structuralism in History and the Social Sciences,” American Quarterly vol. 30, 3 (1978): 297. 
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that because of New France’s subordinate position to France, European influence 
dominated New France culture. Historian Dale Miquelon acknowledged this extensively, 
and argued that New France was “a supplement to Europe,” meaning that its primary 
purpose was to glorify and economically enrich France.51 Newer histories continue to 
consider New France within France’s imperial orbit, but take a more nuanced approach. 
Historian Eric Hinderaker’s Elusive Empires argues that empires were administrative 
bodies as well as zones of cultural interaction.52 Hinderaker’s work is important in 
considering the operation of imperial policy on the ground. Historian James Pritchard’s In 
Search of Empire discusses the difficulties that the French Empire had in creating and 
spreading authority in the Americas, informing discussion and appreciation of effective 
government in New France and consistent responses to the illicit fur trade.53 Pritchard is 
differentiated from those before him, such as Miquelon, in this sense, as he argues that the 
logistics of maintaining New France was more of a burden than a ‘supplement’ to France. 
Historian Kenneth J. Banks examines the concept of a ‘French Atlantic’ in his book Chasing 
Empire Across the Sea.54 Banks describes how the Atlantic created a physical and logistical 
gap that hampered imperial efficiency, and was a hindrance to uniform governance 
between empire and colony; I use this idea throughout my thesis to demonstrate how 
edicts from Versailles were difficult to implement in New France. Banks also diverges from 
those before him by arguing that geography, rather than people, was a primary 
determinant of the cultural and administrative configurations of New France. This ‘New 
                                                          
51 Dale Miquelon, New France, 1701-1744: “A Supplement to Europe” (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1987), 5. 
52 Eric Hinderaker, Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673-1800 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1997), xi-xv. 
53 James Pritchard, In Search of Empire: The French in the Americas, 1670-1730 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), xxi. 
54 Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea, 4. 
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World’ was one that was not simply an extension of France. It had qualities that were 
distinct from – even contrary to – those in France. As such, the people who inhabited it 
were of a very different character. 
The fur trade was as important to the structure of New France as culture or 
imperialism, and it was through the fur trade that coureurs de bois and colonial 
administrators interacted. In Fur, Fortune, and Empire, historian Eric Jay Dolin offers a 
compelling narrative of this interaction by looking at how the fur trade shaped empire on 
the continent.55 A connection between the fur trade and empire is not unique to Dolin’s 
work. In his article “Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe,” historian Thomas 
Wien defines the fur trade as a key component in the crucial Euro-Indigenous alliance 
systems that influenced how colonies governed.56 Historian Catherine Desbarats built on 
Wien’s thesis in her article “The Cost of Early Canada’s Native Alliances,” ultimately arguing 
that French-Indigenous alliances against the British were in part fueled by the fur trade.57 
The diplomatic importance of illicit fur trading is outlined by historian Jon Parmenter in his 
article “The Significance of the ‘Illegal Fur Trade’.” Parmenter argues that illegal fur trading 
was important for not just empires and colonizers, but for Indigenous peoples as well. He 
indicates that illegal fur trading was key to the Iroquois Confederacy’s neutrality policy 
after the signing of the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701.58 Although illicit fur trading could 
                                                          
55 Dolin, Fur, Fortune, and Empire: The Epic History of the Fur Trade in America, xv-xvi. 
56 Wien, “Selling Beaver Skins in North America and Europe, 1720-1760,” 293. 
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be diplomatically important, we know that some colonial administrators did try to reduce – 
or at least hinder – it. Eugene Tesdahl’s recent PhD dissertation “The Price of Empire” 
questions the ability of administrators to curtail illicit trade, and argues that smuggling was 
a standard pattern of fur trade. Tesdahl suggests that the trade regulations that 
administrators imposed on illicit trading increased, rather than decreased, the contraband 
trade.59 Gilles Havard’s recent publication, Histoire des coureurs de bois: Amérique du Nord, 
1600 – 1840, is a significant addition to coureurs de bois and fur trade history that provides 
a modern French perspective on subjects that are sometimes misunderstood in English 
histories. I build on Havard’s depiction of coureurs de bois (and voyageurs) as 
‘transimperial’ figures, who flouted French laws and benefitted the French Empire in North 
America, both economically and diplomatically.60 These scholars show that the fur trade, on 
either side of the law, was tied to the emerging identity of New France, and was a crucial 
component of this colonial world. 
Taking account of what occurs on the peripheries of empire was particularly useful 
for my thesis. Historian Marcus Rediker’s analysis of Golden Age pirates helped to inform a 
greater understanding of the motivations of coureurs de bois, both of whom enjoyed 
measures of freedom, but whose activities were largely economically driven.61 Historian 
Douglas R. Burgess, Jr. states that the relationship between pirates and colonial 
administrators was often one of mutual benefit, and that pirates were given a degree of 
freedom in order to bring commercial advantages to Anglo-American colonies such as New 
                                                          
59 Tesdahl, “The Price of Empire: Smuggling Between New York and New France,” 50. 
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York.62 This form of colonial compromise and adaptation frames a discussion of 
administrative and commoner responses to the illicit fur trade. Borderlands theory also 
helps to better comprehend the relationship between the French Empire and coureurs de 
bois. Historians Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron offer a useful definition of frontiers as 
meeting places of varied peoples where geographic and cultural borders are blurred, and 
borderlands as “…contested boundaries between colonial domains.”63 Adelman and Aron 
argue that borderlands conflict shaped frontier relations, and that the transition from inter-
imperial competition to international coexistence formed ‘bordered lands’ into 
borderlands.64 In her introduction to the 2008 special issue of the Michigan Historical 
Review, historian Nora Faires argues that there is an “…emerging body of scholarship that 
understands borderlands as both tangible and intangible spaces,” and that imperial 
struggles are crucial to understanding how borderlands spaces are divided into imperial or 
national territories.65 As political scientist James C. Scott wrote in The Art of Not Being 
Governed, borderlands are defined as geographic spaces that have historically helped 
peripheral peoples evade state control.66 In these borderland zones, a trans-border 
economy and society is created where the lines between legality and illegality are 
blurred.67 The pays d’en haut was one such borderland space that contributed to the 
                                                          
62 Burgess, The Politics of Piracy, 17-21, 36-37. 
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64 Ibid. 
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proliferation of the illicit fur trade. Mary Louise Pratt would consider the pays d’en haut a 
‘contact zone.’ In her work Imperial Eyes, Pratt defines ‘contact zones’ as space of colonial 
encounters, where geographically and historically separated peoples come into ‘contact,’ 
“…in terms of copresence, interaction, interlocking understandings and practices, often 
within radically asymmetrical relations of power.”68 Integrating these theories has 
provided a useful lens for examination into how New France authorities may have 
comprehended the coureurs de bois and their actions. 
Through all of this, what of Intendant Duchesneau? Why does – or why should – his 
story matter? Does it matter that Duchesneau’s counterparts in France believed that the 
imperial vision for New France was not being sufficiently realized? Is there relevance to all 
this? The short answer is that yes, this did all matter. Although Intendant Jacques 
Duchesneau was but one man who served in a civil office in colonial North America for less 
than a decade, there is a lot to be learned from people like him. From imperial 
correspondences, for example, we know that there was tension between the centre and the 
peripheries. Just as decolonization was a long process of concessions, contestation, and 
cooperation, colonization itself was a system that required cultural, political, and 
diplomatic interaction and adaptation.69 Ordinary people contributed to decolonization by 
rebelling against and resisting symbols of imperialism. Similarly, ordinary people also 
influenced how empires governed in the first place – whether they knew it or not – by 
engaging in phenomena such as the illicit fur trade. Due to the clandestine nature of 
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coureurs de bois, we may never definitively know their total numbers, impacts on their 
environment, or successes on the frontier. What we do know, however, is that coureurs de 
bois posed a continual problem for Intendants and Governors who desperately tried to 
create and govern a French Empire in North America. This thesis argues that between 1663 
and 1740, coureurs de bois and the illicit fur trade deteriorated New France’s colonial 
administration, ultimately hindering French imperial development in North America. 
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Chapter 1: Coureurs de bois: Allies and Advocates 
The support of common habitants and merchants for coureurs de bois and illegal fur 
trading was crucial to the continuation of the illicit trade. Coureurs de bois were 
accomplished outdoorsmen, as well as shrewd smugglers and businessmen. They had 
successful illicit enterprises, often operating under the guise of conducting legitimate 
business by utilizing papers certifying work as letter carriers or debt collectors.70 
Historians such as Bernard DeVoto and Eric Jay Dolin frequently present an Anglo-centric 
picture of coureurs de bois as ‘wild men.’71 This decidedly one-dimensional designation of 
coureurs de bois does not tell the entire story. Coureurs de bois were multi-faceted; they 
traded furs illegally, but also cooperated with their Indigenous allies to foster a north-south 
slave trade, and formed a cultural bridge between Euro-Americans and Indigenous 
peoples.72 They were opportunistic and adaptable, temporarily residing in centres such as 
Montreal and Fort Orange depending on their status in the eyes of local officials.73 Daniel A. 
Scalberg has drawn comparisons between the cultural elusiveness of coureurs de bois and 
modern borderland drug-runners.74 While there was undoubtedly a certain ruggedness to 
the secretive fur-trading lifestyles of these men, to entirely define them as ‘wild’ is 
simplistic and neglects their multi-layered character. 
 Coureurs de bois were outsiders in relation to centres of commerce and 
administration like Montreal or Quebec, which were loci of French imperial power in New 
                                                          
70 Jean Lunn, “The Illegal Fur Trade Out of New France, 1713-60,” Canadian Association Report (1939): 63. 
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72 Brett Rushforth, “’A Little Flesh We Offer You’: The Origins of Indian Slavery in New France,” The William 
and Mary Quarterly 60, no. 4 (2003): 799. 
73 Daniel A. Scalberg, “The French-Amerindian Religious Encounter in Seventeenth and Early Eighteenth-
Century New France,” French Colonial History 1 (2002): 103. 
74 Ibid. 
  21  
 
France. Illegal fur trading was focused in New France’s territorial hinterland, which 
undermined colonial law through unsanctioned trade, and made coureurs de bois 
disruptors of the imperial agenda.75 In 1682, the French Crown worked with colonial 
administrators, such as Governor de La Barre, to halt disorder in the colony through 
concerted efforts against coureurs de bois.76 Much like the bandits, outlaws, pirates, and 
brigands in Europe and the Atlantic world, coureurs de bois disregarded laws and sanctions, 
causing administrators to draw easy comparisons between the groups.77 Coureurs de bois 
were diametrically opposed to an overarching governing body that would dictate when, 
how, and with whom they could trade. Conversely, the men who administered this 
governing body – colonial officials who were appointed to control trade – became some of 
the greatest benefactors of the illicit fur trade. 
New France officials may have viewed coureurs de bois as outsiders, those who lived 
a life away from civilized settler society, but many habitants and merchants did not 
consider the clandestine traders as strangers. Additionally, many coureurs de bois also had 
strong cultural or familial ties to the Indigenous nations in the interior.78 New France’s 
reliance on the fur trade meant that many colonists engaged in small-scale commerce on a 
daily basis.79 Most habitants were relatively familiar with the rules of regulated commerce, 
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and the prevalence of unsupervised trade, which made profits from illicit trade activities 
attractive.80 Acceptance of illicit trade was not universal, however, and groups such as the 
Jesuits and other ecclesiastical representatives detested the penchant for coureurs de bois 
to trade in brandy, and their priority of ‘profit over morality’.81 Despite Jesuit aversion to 
illicit trade, there is some truth to historian Jean Lunn’s exaggerated claim that in New 
France, the “...community [was] interested almost without exception in the smuggling 
trade.”82 Finally, French traders continually formed lasting familial, economic, and social 
bonds with peoples such as the mission Iroquois, commonly referred to as “Kahnawake 
Mohawks,” who also frequently contributed to illicit trading.83 These mission Mohawks 
were important contributors to the illicit fur trade, as the northern furs that they obtained 
and traded were considered to be of the highest quality. Business-savvy coureurs de bois 
quickly realized that association with mission Mohawks was especially important in 
acquiring sought-after northern furs, and forming these bonds was regarded as a 
premium.84 Historian Jon Parmenter argues that for their efforts, the illicit fur trade 
“...represented the primary means by which the Canadian mission Iroquois upheld their 
self-determination, and supported themselves economically.”85 As insiders to the habitant 
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and merchant community as well as many Indigenous communities, coureurs de bois held 
an advantaged position with two of the most important groups to French empire-building 
in North America. 
 The proliferation of coureurs de bois in New France was the result of the relative 
lack of control that colonial officials had over the colony. Compared to absolutist France 
with its tightly controlled top-down administration, New France was ‘disorderly.’ For 
example, in his book Contraband, historian Michael Kwass focuses on smuggling and 
criminality in Old France. He argues that brutal crackdowns on illicit activity resulted in 
harsh punishments like executions and bodily harm.86 Just as in New France, France had 
trade restrictions on valuable commodities like tobacco and cloth from India, and similarly 
had problems with contraband smugglers. Unlike New France, however, smugglers were 
easier to apprehend in France. Death sentences accounted for twenty per cent of the 
approximately five hundred smuggler criminal sentences dispensed every year in mid-
eighteenth-century France.87 In New France, administrative power over colonial 
inhabitants was tenuous, and the borders between settlement and hinterland were ill-
defined. This allowed an enterprising habitant, who worked his farm and traded legally in 
small wares, to slip into the backcountry for a time and trade illicitly as a coureur de bois, 
only to later return to farming. The blurred borders between settlement and frontier 
therefore limited the ability for colonial officials to exert their authority in these hinterland 
zones, and created a very different regulatory environment from the tightly managed realm 
of Old France. For example, in 1738 only two of New France’s seventy-three criminal 
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sentences of execution, exile, or penal labour were against coureurs de bois.88 Although 
there were regulations regarding illicit trade and the threat of punishment often loomed 
for coureurs de bois and those who supported them, enforcement of such laws was spotty at 
best. 
Punishments for coureurs de bois were frequently revised, and sometimes rescinded 
altogether.89 The office of King Louis XV issued a response in 1737 to an edict from over 
twenty years earlier that had authorized galley punishment for coureurs de bois.90 This 
revision was released at a time when there were marked tensions in ensuring colonial 
population growth, keeping colonial inhabitants loyal in order to compete with English 
colonies, and trying to enforce some sort of control over the fur trade. The response stated 
that harsh galley punishments must be lifted, as the threat of galley-slavery scared young 
men engaged in the fur trade from returning to centres of French influence like Montreal.91 
New France officials sometimes softened punishments on their own accord, or took 
alliances and conflicts into account when interpreting laws and handing down verdicts. For 
example, historian Jan Grabowski argues that French judicial courts often absolved 
Indigenous peoples who broke French laws in order to maintain good French-Indigenous 
relations.92 Compared to France itself, colonial officials therefore exerted less control over 
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its people, sometimes as a strategic choice, but oftentimes because of the realities of North 
American frontier spaces. 
 Coureurs de bois and systems of control in New France were connected. At their 
core, coureurs de bois and colonial disorder were not self-contained problems. The weak 
colonial government of New France was disorganized, and as such, unable to enforce some 
of its ordinances. New France administrative weakness was tied to competition and 
rivalries among administrators, jurisdictional overlap, and demographic issues. As the 
population of New France remained low relative to the English colonies, any economic, 
military, or diplomatic problems would have been exacerbated.93 This administrative 
weakness created fertile ground for clandestine fur trade to flourish. The illicit fur trade 
was left largely unchecked, and therefore continued to grow. Furthermore, coureurs de bois 
changed how the government operated within New France because of their connectedness 
with colonial inhabitants and administrators. These close relationships compromised the 
ability of Governors and Intendants to maintain colonial control. The lack of control within 
New France resulted in, and was a product of, the proliferation of coureurs de bois and the 
illicit fur trade. 
 
Administrative Responses to Illicit Trade 
Smugglers, including coureurs de bois, are typically thought of as acting 
clandestinely, yet this was not necessarily always so. The word ‘clandestine’ suggests that 
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coureurs de bois and their trade were hidden. Many fur trade scholars accept that the 
actions of coureurs de bois were hidden, and this was due both to the trade occurring on the 
fringes of empire in the North American hinterlands, as well as because the trade was 
illegal.94 While there is an absence of individual coureurs de bois testimony in the written 
historical record, many of the people whose lives were affected by the illicit fur trade, such 
as legal traders and habitants, certainly knew of their presence. A common jurisdictional 
dilemma is revealed in Governor Frontenac’s correspondence with the French ministry in 
1679. He wrote that “...since the people say they have no funds and that they fear the 
coureurs de bois will return to the Dutch and the English laden with furs, they pray that 
Monsieur Duchesneau renews an order against those who would equip and house them.”95 
Frontenac’s statement reveals a fear that law-abiding traders had of unrestricted illicit 
trading and habitant patronage of coureurs de bois: the fear that this laxity would divert 
trade away from French centres, and towards Dutch and English ones. Frontenac’s 
dilemma was that, as Intendants were charged with civil administration, Frontenac needed 
to rely on Intendant Duchesneau’s cooperation. Problems arose because not only did 
Frontenac and Duchesneau commonly clash on policy, ordinances such as this had the 
potential to affect the security of the colony, which rested with Frontenac as Governor. It is 
also compelling that Frontenac alluded to fears that “the people” had of the ruin that 
coureurs de bois would bring to the colony, while also acknowledging that groups of 
coureurs de bois were being housed and sheltered by some of the people.96 Frontenac 
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understood that some common people had a vested interest in the profits of the illicit 
trade, and that they would willingly house or supply coureurs de bois. The illicit fur trade 
was clandestine only insofar that it was hidden from authorities, but not necessarily the 
settler population, meaning that there was a disconnect between the colonial leadership 
and people on the ground.97 
 Corruption among some New France administrators allowed coureurs de bois and 
the illicit fur trade to flourish. Chief among those who were accused of corruption were 
Governor Frontenac and members of his inner circle: Nicolas Perrot, Sieur du Lhut, and 
Sieur de La Salle.98 Intendant Duchesneau wrote to the French ministry in November 1681 
about a problem in New France whereby coureurs de bois received protection from some 
members of the administration.99 Duchesneau cited a lack of oversight as the cause for the 
illicit fur trade’s suffusion throughout the colony. He argued that he needed to be given 
more power and control over New France to repair its ineffective and corrupt system of 
governance.100 Duchesneau believed that if he were given the power to end corruption in 
New France, he would be able to curb the illicit fur trade.101 Historian Kenneth J. Banks has 
suggested that Frontenac had a personal interest in the fur trade, evidenced by the creation 
of Fort Frontenac on the Cataraqui River.102 Support from corrupt officials within the 
colonial administration helped to extend the illicit fur trade in New France between 1663 
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and 1700. Officials who ignored, and at times, actively supported illegal activities helped 
foster the growth of the illicit fur trade. 
 Intendant Duchesneau continued his criticism of Frontenac in a letter to the 
Minister of the Marine in 1681, which emphasized the detrimental effect that ignoring the 
illicit fur trade was having on New France’s structure and organization. By Duchesneau’s 
estimation, the issue of illegal coureurs de bois trade had become progressively worse over 
a period of four years. The problem had been exacerbated due to the successes that 
coureurs de bois continued to have in plying their trade.103 Duchesneau noted that “...the 
woods give them great capabilities to evade Justice,” and that when they were caught, the 
punishments were lax.104 The substantial financial rewards that coureurs de bois gained 
from illicit trade continually enticed more and more young French habitants to become 
coureurs de bois themselves.105 The problem that this created for New France was that 
continued connections to law-abiding habitants allowed coureurs de bois to more easily 
appeal for supplies and boarding.106 The continual rise of coureurs de bois numbers ran 
contrary to the goals set out by Minister Colbert and other colonial architects, who wanted 
New France to act as a self-sufficient colony bordering the St. Lawrence River, peopled with 
sedentary farmers who would provide agricultural staples for the metropole.107 Habitant 
support for coureurs de bois undermined this imperial vision and complicated the task of 
running the colony for the colonial administrators. Finally, habitant ignorance, or willful 
                                                          
103 LAC, Série C11A, Correspondance Générale, R11577-4-2-F, “Lettre de Duchesneau au ministre - la 
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support of the illicit fur trade, not only undermined the authority of New France officials, it 
also had the potential to influence the colonial economy and habitant engagement in illegal 
affairs. 
 Minister Colbert’s accusations of Frontenac’s involvement in the illicit fur trade is 
some of the best evidence for the Governor’s entanglement in illicit affairs. Colbert’s letter 
to Frontenac in 1680 on the subject of the illicit fur trade stated that due to evidence and 
testimonies against the Governor, the King and French Court “...can no longer give more 
credence to these testimonies, and parts that are against you by those who have appeared 
in the spirit of His Majesty have been given more substance.”108 Colbert was in fact 
inferring that Frontenac was in some way involved in illicit trade. Colbert was inclined to 
side with Intendant Duchesneau, who honoured and supported his ideas for a densely 
populated and mercantile ‘compact colony,’ similar to that being developed by France’s 
imperial rivals in New England.109 Colbert ultimately decided against punishing Frontenac 
after receiving further public testimonies regarding the Governor’s good character. Colbert 
clearly wrote in his letter to Frontenac that his mood had shifted due to “public 
testimonies.”110 This flurry of correspondence between Duchesneau, Frontenac, and 
Colbert, shows that the public had partial knowledge of the role that some colonial officials 
had in maintaining the illicit fur trade.111 The illicit fur trade in New France was not 
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something that was only discussed in hushed tones. Frontenac wrote to Minister Colbert 
that the administration feared traders going to New England or New Netherland to conduct 
their trade, which was at its heart, illicit trading. English or Dutch merchants would not 
have considered this to be illegal trade, however, and there is no reason to believe that it 
would have been hidden, as it sometimes was in New France. Historian Thomas Wien even 
suggests that furs brought illegally to New York accounted for a large portion of the furs 
that were eventually sent to London markets.112 The involvement of powerful men like 
Governor Frontenac in the illicit fur trade advances the idea that this trade altered 
governance in New France. 
 Royal instructions to New France officials show what the French Court thought 
about the colony’s successes in fostering legitimate and beneficial trade. In 1682, the King’s 
court cited opposition to royal orders as being a primary cause of troubles in the fur 
trade.113 The letter states that the principle issue was “...the freedom that many inhabitants 
have, notwithstanding the orders of His Majesty, to go into the woods with brandy to the 
homes of the savages [sic].”114 Due to the distance between France and New France, the 
French Court relied on second-hand information and reports as the basis for accusing 
habitants of illicitly trading with nearby Indigenous communities in the pays d’en haut. The 
assumptions that the French Court made are significant, as they show that the King and his 
Court saw a lack of control as being a hindrance to legitimate trade. The letter goes on to 
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say that illicit traders brought their furs from the interior to places like Montreal and 
Tadoussac, which disrupted sanctioned trade. While most discussions of the illicit fur trade 
focused on coureurs de bois bringing pelts to Dutch, and later English posts, this letter 
reveals that some pelts were brought back to the St. Lawrence River and that illegal trade 
occurred right under the nose of colonial officials in New France.115 There were safe havens 
for coureurs de bois at French posts, and they certainly could find buyers for their illegal 
furs. A market for illicit goods needs buyers, suggesting that merchants in these locations 
were ready and willing to engage with coureurs de bois. 
 Speaking for King Louis XIV, Ministers of the Marine such as Jean-Baptiste Colbert,  
his son the Marquis de Seignelay, and Louis Phélypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain regularly 
bombarded Governor Frontenac with inquiries and criticisms during his tenures 
administrating New France.116 In 1697, for example, Frontenac received a missive from 
Pontchartrain stating that coureurs de bois “...dominate urban communities and there needs 
to be a practical remedy for the successful enablement of the society of the Colony and of 
Trade.”117 The royal court’s impression, formed thousands of miles away from second-hand 
accounts and reports was that coureurs de bois were suffused into the towns and urban 
markets of New France. The supposed coureurs de bois ‘domination’ of towns throughout 
New France suggests a general acceptance, or at least tolerance, that law-abiding habitants 
and merchants had towards these illicit traders.118 At the very least, the visibility of 
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coureurs de bois in New France towns suggests that there was little to stop or even hinder 
coureurs de bois encroachment into urban centres. For coureurs de bois to be able to 
successfully operate in places like Montreal, Quebec, or Trois-Rivières, they would have 
needed an urban support system. Barring the aid of habitants and merchants, coureurs de 
bois would have had to rely on a considerable lack of administrative power to operate in 
these areas.119 
 
Habitants, Merchants, Coureurs de bois 
Coureurs de bois, like many other types of smugglers, are typically thought of as 
clandestine actors, since the nature of their illicit activities means that they are rarely 
found in historical records. It is assumed that they concealed their illegal trade from 
authorities who sought to impede them, or the law-abiding public who would turn them 
in.120 And yet, as we have already seen, Governor Frontenac’s letter to First Minister 
Colbert in 1679 clearly indicates that some habitants were sheltering coureurs de bois, and 
others knew full well that illicit trade was occurring.121 The illicit fur trade itself was not 
always acknowledged by authorities, but its presence was not unknown to the public or 
colonial officials.122 
 There is ample evidence that there was extensive support for coureurs de bois 
among the broader public. For example, on September 27, 1672, Frontenac released an 
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ordinance expressly forbidding the actions of those “…habitants who openly or secretly sell 
them or give them goods by which they are able to continue their trade with the 
Indians.”123 Frontenac blamed this public support as being the chief cause as to why the 
number of coureurs de bois steadily increased through the 1660s and 1670s.124 While there 
is mention of coureurs de bois, this ordinance is almost wholly devoted to denouncing 
habitant supporters and accusing them of disrupting the “...public tranquility and 
generality of the colony.”125 Frontenac also clearly outlined that habitants who sold or 
provided goods, commodities, drinks, and pelts to unlicensed traders were considered 
supporters of illegal trade.126 Governor Frontenac believed that habitant support for 
coureurs de bois significantly hindered attempts to curtail the illicit fur trade; simply 
punishing unlicensed traders was not enough. 
 Efforts to put an end to the illicit fur trade proved ineffective and on November 6, 
1674, Frontenac issued another ordinance meant to reinforce earlier mandates. 
Frontenac’s wording suggests that he was “...renewing the defences per the order of 
September 27, 1672,” as a sort of affirmation of the previous decree.127 Frontenac was far 
more inclusive than in 1672, and orders that “...all French subjects of the King domiciled or 
non-domiciled to not be away from their homes under any pretext over twenty-four hours 
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without written leave.”128 This was an all-encompassing order that left little room for 
manipulation or interpretation. It stated that punishments for disobedience could be as 
severe as death, the caveat being that executions were ultimately left to the discretion of 
administrators such as fort commandants, seigneurs, and judges.129 As the ordinance left 
the severity of punishments to the discretion of individual administrators, there is an 
implied acceptance here that one blanket decree could not satisfy the multitude of cases 
that would appear across New France.130  
 There were a few important differences between the ordinance of 1674 and one of 
1673. After citing that punishments for illicit trading were fines or execution, the 1674 
ordinance reads that “…promoting or equipping the so-called vagabonds and coureurs de 
bois,” was a criminal offence.131 This was clearly a harsher indictment against supporters of 
illicit trade than was given in 1673, where Frontenac “...very deeply express[ed] 
inhibitions” against those who did so.132 In just one year the tone against those supporting 
coureurs de bois had changed from one of disapproval to one that threatened harsh 
punishments or even execution. New France authorities had come to the realization that 
the illicit fur trade existed because there was a market for it. Small-scale trading was a part 
of New France life – coureurs de bois with high-quality yet inexpensive English goods were 
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enticing trade partners.133 Attractive trade goods could entice habitants to break the law 
and trade in illegal wares, thus fueling coureurs de bois activity. Legitimate merchants and 
habitants were enticed by a black market for cheap furs and other goods. Historian James 
Pritchard argues that French illicit traders could triple their price for northern furs in 
Albany, as well as receive higher-quality English trade goods. Albany merchants also paid 
in cash, rather than bills of exchange, which would have been more highly sought after. 
Given this lucrative Albany market, coureurs de bois could then bring these illegally traded 
goods back to Montreal to trade with French merchants. These French merchants 
numbered among the accused ‘supporters of coureurs de bois.’134 In this context, coureurs 
de bois were the product of a problem with the New France trade economy, where illegal 
trade was especially attractive to habitants and fur traders alike. 
 Incidental support for illicit trade occurred in New France as well, whereby colonial 
administrators unintentionally supported coureurs de bois because of the need to secure 
alliances with Indigenous peoples and to protect the colony from imperial rivals.135 This 
type of support developed because administrators were sometimes unable to pay French 
soldiers on the frontier, but still needed to find a way to secure the defence of New France. 
For example, in 1698, Governor Frontenac explained to Secretary of State Louis Phélypeaux 
Pontchartrain that soldiers garrisoned at frontier posts traded illicitly out of necessity, 
noting “…it is impossible to have the Commandants and the soldiers in the 
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[Michilimackinac] and Miami Posts live on their salary alone.”136 Frontenac’s inability to 
properly pay and provision troops at the western posts fostered support for the 
continuation of the illicit fur trade.137 There is no mention of coureurs de bois, and how they 
fit into French incidental support for illicit trade. It was decidedly harder for colonial 
officials to monitor the activities of coureurs de bois, yet the fact that Frontenac openly 
supported the garrison soldiers’ need to trade illicitly is further evidence of the Governor’s 
vested interest in the illicit fur trade.138 Both Frontenac’s government and French colonial 
officials at the interior forts saw the value in, if not the need for, illicit trade. 
 Popular support for coureurs de bois was not universal and French colonial settlers 
did not all benefit equally from illicit trade. Jean Talon was the first Intendant of New 
France, and took up his position in 1665, just two years after New France became a royal 
colony. Talon served two separate terms as Intendant, from 1665-68, and again from 1670-
72. In his final year of service, he appealed to colonial officials to defend habitants against 
the ills of illicit trade. He wrote that coureurs de bois were “…a ruin to honest inhabitants 
who hope for a lawful gain with the Indians, and who are used to the Indians coming to 
them.”139 Talon denounced coureurs de bois by showing them to be disruptors of legal trade 
                                                          
136 Joseph Peyser, ed. and trans., Letters from New France: The Upper Country 1686-1783 (Urbana and Chicago: 
University of Illinois Press, 1992), 69, “Frontenac to Pontchartrain,” Quebec, 1698. 
137 The context of this letter is that Frontenac is discussing unauthorized trade. In this case, soldiers and their 
superiors would not be given congé or other letters of permission to engage in fur trading. As such, this is the 
definition of illicit trade. Louise Dechêne states that soldiers garrisoning interior posts supplemented their 
pay with fur trading, which consumed more and more of their energy throughout the period. See: Dechêne, 
Habitants and Merchants, 19. Gilles Havard lumps coureurs de bois, engagés and soldiers in as those who 
would be “disobedient to the King” (i.e., pursuing illicit trade) in the earlier years of expansion into the pays 
d’en haut. See: Havard, Empires et métissages, 327. Claiborne A. Skinner states that the fur trade was a popular 
occupation for ex-soldiers, as it allowed them capital through adventure, which would have been something 
that drew many to soldiering in the first place. See: Skinner, The Upper Country, 16. 
138 LAC, Série B, Lettres envoyées, R1157-3-0-F, “Colbert à M. de Frontenac. Sa Majesté, après avoir examiné 
...,” 1680, 55/18. This is but one example of a document that highlights Frontenac’s interests in illicit trade. 
139 BAnQ, Ordonnances, Commissions, Etc, Etc, des Gouverneurs et Intendants, NF 1639-1706, “Ordonnance 
de M. Talon qui défend aux habitants de quitter leaurs demeures pour courir les bois et faire la traite avec les 
  37  
 
and honest traders and merchants. Talon complained that coureurs de bois leave “…their 
homes and the care of their families,” in order to trade with Indigenous peoples.140 He 
wrote that “…they go into the wild to the Indians with drink, without Christianity, without 
sacraments, without religion, without priests, without laws, and without magistrates.”141 
New France’s first Intendant saw good reason to denounce coureurs de bois, and tried to 
quell a growing illicit trade and undermine the support of normally law-abiding merchants 
and habitants. Not all habitants or colonial officials would make allowances for illicit trade, 
and Jean Talon was one administrator who would not stand for its suffusion into New 
France. 
 
Moral Conflict: Jesuits v. Coureurs de bois 
 A group that almost entirely opposed the illicit fur trade, and coureurs de bois more 
specifically, was the Jesuits. The Jesuits were but a single Catholic Order among many in 
New France, but their voice against illicit fur trading emerged as one of the loudest. This 
was due to the zeal with which they approached their missionary work of converting 
Indigenous peoples to Catholicism, and their rejection of liquor, material excess, and 
debauchery.142 A 1672-73 relation from the Mission of Saint François Xavier des Prés in the 
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pays d’en haut conveyed a biting criticism of illicit trade, stating that “...brandy has ruined 
the Algonquin missions.”143 It blamed “...the insatiable avarice of the [lay] French,” and 
condemned those who “...go as far as two and three hundred leagues to seek the Savages 
[sic] in the woods, for the purpose of getting their furs by making them intoxicated.”144 
Coureurs de bois commonly traveled to Indigenous communities to trade in furs as well as 
liquor.145 Furthermore, the Mission of Saint François Xavier des Prés was described as 
being “...in the midst of the French who carry on that detestable traffic.”146 Illicit trade 
occurred in specific areas, and “detestable” to the Jesuits of the Mission Saint François 
Xavier des Prés.”147 As the example of the Jesuits illustrates, support for the illicit trade 
varied depending on certain demographics.  
 Father François de Crespieul served as a Jesuit missionary to the Montagnais for 
over thirty years until his death in 1702, and wrote about coureurs de bois and the troubles 
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they brought to the Tadoussac Mission in 1671.148 Father Crespieul argued that “the less 
one employs the coureurs de bois, the better it is for the Mission and for the trade.”149 
Crespieul’s musings suggest Jesuit knowledge of coureurs de bois ‘employment’ in the New 
France economy. The wording here is important, for as a rule, illicit traders would not have 
been ‘employed.’ By specifically denouncing coureurs de bois ‘employment,’ Crespieul is 
alluding to administrative or merchant patronage of illicit traders. Crespieul also wrote that 
great efforts should be made to keep coureurs de bois away from young women and 
marriageable girls, and remarked that coureurs de bois should not have nor trade liquor.150 
These denunciations display that some Jesuit missionaries took a hardened stance against 
coureurs de bois and deplored the kind of atmosphere illicit trade created. Missionaries, 
particularly Jesuits, were agents of ecclesiastical imperialism and were tied to, but not 
entirely synonymous with, state power.151 Like other colonial agents, Jesuits had their own 
objectives, which informed their opinions of coureurs de bois. The primary objective of 
Jesuit missionaries was conversion, and therefore the perceived lechery and immorality of 
coureurs de bois was seen as particularly dangerous. Again, it is important to demonstrate 
that support for illicit trade was not all-encompassing, but that it was support from key 
members of New France society that allowed it to proliferate. 
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 Jesuits did not simply chastise coureurs de bois or complain about illicit trade, they 
also actively appealed for punishments against illicit traders. Father Joseph-François 
Lafitau’s memorial on the sale of liquor was a petition to the Sovereign Council to punish 
liquor traffickers.152 Lafitau framed this petition in terms colonial officials could 
understand, and designated liquor traffickers as threats to New France, and boons to 
English rivals. He wrote that “...the fugitive french [sic] who no longer dare to return home, 
take the Savages [sic] with them among the English to help them in transporting the goods 
that they buy there.”153 Smuggling and illegal trafficking was pervasive throughout 
Indigenous societies, and Father Lafitau suggested why this was so.154 Indigenous 
violations of French laws, which according to men like Father Lafitau was brought on by 
coureurs de bois contrariness, created an environment of general Indigenous hesitancy to 
observe Christian rules and regulations. The result was resistance to Jesuit attempts at 
Christianization.155 Lafitau stressed that illicit trade was “...almost the sole obstacle to the 
labors of the missionaries.”156 Lafitau was a Jesuit father who sought an end to the illicit 
trade for his own gains. His strategy to end illicit trading – appealing to higher 
administrative authorities – shows that he actively opposed illicit trade, rather than 
passively waited for its demise. Jesuit missions and ‘mission Indians’ often acted as 
                                                          
152 Reuben Gold Thwaites, ed., The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit 
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intermediaries between colonies and opposing Indigenous nations or potential Indigenous 
allies.157 By actively calling for action against coureurs de bois, Father Lafitau used his 
influence as a colonial ambassador for Indigenous relations in an attempt to influence New 
France government policy. 
 In 1702, Father Étienne de Carheil outlined to Governor Louis-Hector de Callières 
what the Jesuits considered beneficial trade. An examination of Carheil’s argument 
provides an interesting contrast with Jesuit letters and relations concerning illicit trade.158 
Carheil continually referred to ‘the Company,’ or the Compagnie de la Nouvelle France, 
which had a monopoly on the Western fur trade at the time, for Carheil knew that the 
Company had a vested interest in stopping illicit trade as well. Father Carheil argued that if 
trade at Montreal could not sufficiently continue, then there would be “...no other measure 
for the Company to adopt than to send and maintain in our missions up here Selected 
persons, sober and virtuous, Intelligent, and well versed in everything connected with That 
trade.”159 Jesuits did not shun trade unequivocally, only trade that was harmful to their 
endeavors. Carheil continued: “...these men should be sent, in whatever number the 
Company might Deem necessary and sufficient for Carrying on its Trade, for attaching 
thereto the Savages [sic], and for retaining them in it both by their presence and that of 
their wares.”160 As long as trade was conducted by chaste men who did not sell liquor to 
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Indigenous peoples, it was accepted and even desired among the missions.161 What is 
perhaps most compelling about this document is what it says about individual agendas 
within the colony.162 Different societal groups in New France interacted with trade – both 
legal and otherwise – at different times and for different reasons. How each group 
approached trade depended on the goals of the group and the context of trade. Illegal trade 
was not always wholly condemned, and legal trade sometimes had noneconomic value to 
groups like the Jesuits or Indigenous groups. For this reason, the illicit fur trade must 
always be set against a contextual background that asks what was at stake for its 
supporters and critics alike. 
 
The French Court and Amnesty 
As New France grew, French imperial attitudes at Versailles towards the colony and 
the illicit fur trade shifted as well. The shift in opinions at Versailles to illicit trade was 
particularly pronounced after the turn of the eighteenth century, when intermittent global 
conflicts gripped European empires.163 France’s involvement in wars in Europe siphoned 
resources away from the colonies and the empire more broadly. The War of the Spanish 
Succession was no exception, and as it was drawing to a close, King Louis XIV authorized 
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Governor General Philippe de Rigaud, Marquis de Vaudreuil to grant amnesty to coureurs 
de bois in 1714.164 Vaudreuil had proposed that punishments against coureurs de bois be 
rescinded and arrests of illicit traders suspended.165 This concession emphasized France’s 
demographic weakness and limited military power in New France, and the lack of French 
influence in North America.166 The priorities of the French government, particularly the 
Crown, dictated how the administration dealt with coureurs de bois. Although illicit trade 
threatened the authority of government and the economic stability of the colony, 
insufficient military power threatened the colony’s ability to defend itself from imperial 
enemies like the English or Indigenous adversaries. Tolerance for and acceptance of 
coureurs de bois was not common, but, at times, imperial strife made it necessary for 
imperial and colonial officials to turn a blind eye. 
 Amnesty and more forgiving policies did not end with the War of the Spanish 
Succession. In 1737, three years prior to the start of the War of the Austrian Succession, 
there was a revision to the coureurs de bois amnesty policy. Total amnesty for coureurs de 
bois had been retracted in the years following the War of the Spanish Succession, and in 
1737 there was more concern with simply reducing the severity of the punishment for 
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illicit trading.167 Unlike the proclamation of amnesty of 1714, this revision did not 
specifically state that the war was the reason for amnesty. Rather, the 1737 revision stated 
that a reduction in punishment was the result of harsh punishments inducing coureurs de 
bois to stay in the wilderness.168 In both instances, New France needed the manpower and 
physical presence of young men to maintain imperial power and authority in North 
America. An edict from Versailles issued in March 1716 declared that coureurs de bois 
would be punished with “pain of the galley.”169 The French Court altered its punishment 
policy for coureurs de bois merely two years after amnesty was given in 1714.170 Frequent 
revisions to royal policy was typical of the push and pull of authority within the colonial 
sphere. The French Crown would never tolerate criminal activity on principle, but merely 
had to concede to it under extenuating circumstances. Concessions of this type display the 
tenuous hold that the French Empire had on its North American holdings, and suggests why 
colonial officials often trod carefully in their dealings with coureurs de bois.171 France was 
unable to enforce absolute rule in New France and relied on cooperation with the colony’s 
population, which included coureurs de bois. 
 
Conclusion 
                                                          
167 LAC, Série B, Lettres envoyées, R1157-3-0-F, “Lettres patentes portant amnistie pour les coureurs des bois 
de ...,” April 1737. This letter specifically states that there will be reduction of punishment for illicit trading 
such that coureurs de bois will not be subject to the galleys.  
168 Ibid. 
169 Ibid. 
170 This is in relation to the document of 1714 previously discussed. 
171 Havard, Empires et métissages, 339. Havard here discusses how fort commandants in particular had to 
compromise and be malleable in their dealings with illicit trade. This was due to the soldiery often dealing 
with illicit traders, or becoming illicit traders themselves. 
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Connections and relationships between coureurs de bois and other New France 
colonial inhabitants were not entirely beneficial or detrimental. Commissioners, 
commanders, and administrators interacted with coureurs de bois for their own interests in 
the illicit fur trade. Common habitants utilized coureurs de bois connections to illicit 
merchandise for favorable prices and quality goods.172 But at the same time, coureurs de 
bois were typically condemned, and open support for them was punishable with fines or 
even death. What emerges is the vision of a system that was deeply connected to illicit 
commerce, but due to royal decrees and oversight, had to denounce it unequivocally. The 
result of this situation was inextricably tied to New France’s status as a frontier colony. 
While imperial law-makers across the Atlantic expected colonial administration to be 
conducted honourably, the situation on the ground did not always permit it to be so. 
French merchandise was of relatively high price and low quality, making illicit commerce 
continually enticing to both habitants and administrators alike. 
Ultimately, coureurs de bois were an imperial nightmare due to their connections to 
the general populace and colonial administrators. Their connections made them difficult to 
separate from law-abiding citizens and those in control, causing repeated inefficiencies in 
governing and controlling them. The interconnectedness between coureurs de bois and the 
rest of the colony muddied the administrative process, creating a slowness of government 
and a lack of follow-through in justice and punishment. A loosening of colonial control led 
to a greater increase in coureurs de bois, and the problem of illicit trading continued for 
decades as the royal government attempted to strengthen. Colonial development was 
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consequently hindered by the lack of administrative stability within New France brought 
on by coureurs de bois and the illicit fur trade.  
  47  
 
Chapter 2: Illicit Trade and the Fracturing of New France Leadership 
The prevalence of the illicit fur trade in New France meant that most colonial 
inhabitants came into contact with the trade in one way or another, but it was ultimately 
left to colonial administrators to curb its growth. The Governor General and Intendant 
were the preeminent administrators in New France.173 The Intendant was the highest-
ranking civic official and dealt with areas such as the administration of justice and 
overseeing public finances.174 Conversely, military and diplomatic matters fell to the 
Governor, who was the King’s representative in North America.175 As members of the New 
France leadership, the Governor General and Intendant sat on an administrating body 
called the Sovereign Council, which also included civilian officials, the Bishop of New 
France, and nobles.176 The Governor, the Intendant, and the Bishop all had specific 
responsibilities and jurisdictions. In some instances, however, there was overlap in these 
powers and roles, which created jurisdictional conflicts.177 The Governor oversaw the 
colonial military and broad imperial interests, which included the western fur trade. The 
Intendant generally administered the ‘economy’ of New France, which also happened to 
include the western fur trade. Finally, the Bishop was in charge of both tending to French 
Catholics in Canada and overseeing missionary activities of various Catholic orders in the 
hinterland, where fur trading took place. Within this political climate and charged with 
their personal responsibilities, the heads of New France’s government had to confront the 
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problem of illicit trading. Illicit trade might seem as though it was solely under the 
jurisdiction of the Intendant, as Intendants dealt with colonial justice. The diplomatic 
implications of trade with Indigenous peoples, however, meant that Governors also had to 
pay heed to the persistent problem of illicit trade.178 The result was regular disagreements 
on how to best deal with the illicit trade and coureurs de bois, which ultimately led to 
administrative disunity in New France between 1663 and 1740. 
The individual backgrounds of specific New France administrators informed their 
overall approach to duty and cooperation. Power and authority in New France was 
supposed to flow down from the King’s absolute power, through to colonial officials, then 
land-owning nobles (seigneurs) and finally to common farmers (habitants).179 This 
allocation of power did not always work as intended, due in part to the physical and 
logistical distance between the King and his colonial administrators. In France as well as 
New France, administrators like Intendants and Governors were expected to follow the 
recognized values of nobility and honour, such as adherence to social conventions and 
service to the King.180 Although colonial officials came from an environment where social 
status was paramount, New France historian Gilles Havard argues that the geographical 
realities of New France meant that the social practices of the Ancien Régime faltered or 
disappeared completely.181 Overlapping jurisdictional authority regarding the fur trade 
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combined with more relaxed social conventions in Canada to make administrative rivalries 
at least as pronounced as they were in the Colbertian period of King Louis XIV’s France.182 
New France’s Intendants and Governors often disagreed over how to regulate 
coureurs de bois, which helped to foster intense administrative rivalries. The fur trade was 
a driving force behind New France commerce, and therefore the colony’s commercial 
interests were heavily invested in the success of the trade. The illicit fur trade disrupted 
legally regulated trade and demanded significant attention from colonial officials.183 
Handling the illicit fur trade efficiently and appropriately became a way for colonial 
administrators to demonstrate their effectiveness as leaders.184 Rather than collaborating, 
colonial leaders frequently opposed each other over how to properly deal with the illicit 
trade. For example, Intendant Duchesneau and Governor Frontenac were at odds over the 
fur trade for most of Duchesneau’s tenure as Intendant (1675-82). Disagreements over the 
illicit trade spilled over into other areas, such as colonial security or the implementation of 
justice, and affected the good governance of New France. This caused administrative 
processes to become inefficient, and jeopardized pillars of colonial sustainability, such as 
trade.185  
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Governor Frontenac and Intendant Duchesneau 
Colonial leaders like Intendant Duchesneau or Governor Frontenac did not always 
overtly express their political disagreements, and in fact, they often pretended to cooperate 
with one another for their own and the King’s benefit. In 1681, Intendant Duchesneau 
wrote to Minister Colbert, and expressed surprise over what he felt was Governor 
Frontenac’s questionable behaviour regarding the fur trade. The Intendant professed his 
willingness to work with Frontenac to reign in the estimated seven hundred coureurs de 
bois in New France and the pays d’en haut, and feigned surprise that Frontenac had 
informed the First Minister that the two men were on bad terms.186 By pretending to get 
along with the Governor, Duchesneau was attempting to make Frontenac seem like the 
source of discord. Duchesneau’s supposed “surprise” that Frontenac and he were on bad 
terms mirrored that of the King, and showed the Intendant’s solidarity with the French 
Court.187 In his strategic choice of words, Intendant Duchesneau was able to align himself 
firmly with the will of King Louis XIV and Minister Colbert. Duchesneau’s purpose for doing 
so was to secure or increase his power in New France. Duchesneau avoided slandering 
Frontenac at the outset of his letter to Colbert and walked a line between insinuating that 
the Governor was inept and saying it outright. Intendant Duchesneau dropped this façade 
later, however, in favour of a more straightforward approach. 
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 Intendant Duchesneau continued to appeal to Minister Colbert and King Louis XIV 
for support in his rivalry with Governor Frontenac. Duchesneau established his fidelity and 
fealty to the Crown by saying that “...I promise that everything in this letter that I have said 
is true.”188 To maintain the illusion of congeniality between himself and Frontenac, 
Duchesneau also said that there was some truth in Frontenac’s reports.189 To summarize 
his relationship with Frontenac and devotion to the King, Duchesneau wrote that: 
…despite the bad treatment that I again received from Monsignor [Frontenac] I have 
done my best to obey the orders of his Majesty and those of the Bishop, that my very 
fair judgements in my letters and reports are not only based on the prevention of 
bias, or because of animosity, but on the justice, truth, and fidelity I have for the King 
and our Father of Foundations.190 
 
This passage provides insight into the strained relationship between Duchesneau and 
Frontenac, as well as Duchesneau’s attempts to demonstrate his loyalty to the Crown. From 
Duchesneau’s perspective, Frontenac had treated him unjustly, although it is important to 
interrogate these documents and not simply take them at face value. It is possible that 
Duchesneau was being disingenuous in his letter to Minister Colbert to further ingratiate 
himself to the French Court. At the very least, Duchesneau gave the impression that he was 
loyal to the wishes of the King. These revelations provide a useful precursor to continued 
discussions of colonial rivalries, as they form the outline for administrative relationships in 
New France during this period.191 
 Duchesneau’s pleasantries regarding Governor Frontenac slowly fell away as he got 
more specific. For example, he went on to state that Frontenac was not to be trusted in 
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regard to granting trade licenses.192 Duchesneau was referring to a promise made by 
Frontenac that the Governor would no longer grant fur trade licenses for commerce in the 
interior with Indigenous peoples.193 Fur trading outside of centres of French control such 
as Montreal, Quebec, or Trois-Rivières was prohibited.194 Frontenac’s promise of adhering 
to this prohibition was indicative of his fealty to the King and the wishes of the state. 
Duchesneau dismissed Frontenac’s promise by imploring the King and French Court to not 
“...listen to the claims of those who tested the orders of the King.”195 The Intendant further 
disparaged Frontenac’s name by saying that Frontenac did not want Duchesneau to inform 
the King of the multitude of coureurs de bois that plagued New France.196 Duchesneau 
moved beyond trying to feign congruence with Frontenac, and instead questioned the 
Governor’s loyalty and presented Frontenac as someone who could not be trusted with a 
position of authority. 
 Correspondence from the French Court acknowledge how tense the relationship 
between New France’s Governor and Intendant had become. In 1680, Minister of the 
Marine, Jean-Baptiste Colbert, was scathingly critical of Frontenac’s conduct as Governor 
and his behaviour towards Intendant Duchesneau. Colbert accused Frontenac of resisting 
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unity with the Intendant and was more inclined to sympathize with Duchesneau. Colbert 
noted that administrative disunity was problematic to the growth of New France, and 
stated that “...all the divisions arriving in the country are today the main cause of the loss 
and ruin of the new colonies.”197 To the French Court, particularly Minister Colbert, the 
open nature of petty competition and rivalries in New France ran contrary to imperial 
designs, and frustrated colonial development.198 Colbert’s instructions were that the 
“divisions” had to be remedied without resistance or intransigence from either the 
Governor or Intendant.199 To Colbert, discord among colonial administrators was the 
greatest hindrance to further developing France’s colonial empire in North America.200 
While Colbert does not address the specifics of administrative dissonance between 
Duchesneau and Frontenac, he is very clear about how troublesome disparity among the 
colonial leadership could be to the success of an empire.201 
 Colbert’s instructions to Frontenac in 1680 called attention to the divisions between 
the Governor and Intendant Duchesneau. To stress the importance of unity, Colbert 
invoked the word of the King, stating that it was a direct command that the rivalry ceased. 
Colbert first acknowledged that he knew Frontenac had been feigning solidarity with 
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Duchesneau, and then spoke directly for the King and stated that the administration in New 
France had been operating “...absolutely contrary to his will.”202 These instructions show 
the common problems of distance and communication for colonial governments 
throughout the Atlantic world.203 Frontenac understood that the physical distance between 
New France and France allowed him to administer the colony with a degree of autonomy. 
Additionally, without a stable of competent replacements for positions like colonial 
Governor, Frontenac could continue to act and govern as he saw fit.204 
 Colbert’s instructions to Frontenac conclude by reiterating the desires of the King, 
as well as by calling the Governor’s ability into question. Colbert wrote that honour and 
dignity “...are qualities that befit a leader.”205 Colbert alluded to ideas of honour and dignity 
as a way to question if Frontenac had these qualities, in an effort to change his conduct as 
Governor. Minister Colbert was attempting to use a decidedly “Old World” strategy to alter 
“New World” behaviours of those who inhabited and operated the colonies. The inherent 
problem with trying to use European strategies to influence North American governance 
was that the culture, society, geography, and interculturalism of North America made old 
strategies ineffective or inefficient.206 Colbert finished by reminding Frontenac that he was 
fortunate to get a chance to remedy his conduct, rather than simply being presented with a 
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letter of recall. In a final biting insult, the Minister of the Marine finished his letter to the 
Governor, stating that “...His Majesty does not want to have to entirely defer all the orders 
to Duchesneau.”207 Not only did Colbert’s statement again appeal to Frontenac’s honour, 
but it showed overt favoritism towards Frontenac’s colonial rival, Intendant Duchesneau. 
Colbert’s intention was to manipulate Frontenac into falling in line by suggesting that 
Duchesneau was perhaps the more qualified of the two men to run the colony. By 
comparing Governor Frontenac to Intendant Duchesneau, Colbert appealed to Frontenac’s 
ego as an authority figure. According to Colbert, colonial rivalries had a significant effect on 
New France’s success as a colony, and needed to be remedied at every turn. 
Intendant Duchesneau and Governor Frontenac most certainly exaggerated the 
extent of each other’s inefficiencies. Regardless, the rivalry that these men had was indeed 
genuine. King Louis XIV described the rivalry in 1682 as consisting of “...extreme prejudice 
and continual disagreement between Governor Frontenac and Intendant Duchesneau.”208 
The King’s indictment of Frontenac and Duchesneau’s rivalry shows that his patience for 
the Governor and Intendant was waning. King Louis XIV understood that a petty rivalry 
between the top colonial officials in New France detracted from his prestige and glory. 
Discord between the Intendant and Governor “...forces His Majesty to reconcile the one 
with the other.”209 The problem of administrative divisions in New France had escalated to 
envelope the highest authority in the empire, and prior pleasantries began to fall away. The 
King was, however, simply reaffirming Minister Colbert’s argument that incongruence 
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between the Governor and Intendant was the root of all New France’s problems.210 
Condemnations of Frontenac and Duchesneau’s rivalry continued to arrive from Versailles, 
suggesting that colonial rivalries in New France were an ongoing problem. The King 
considered these administrative conflicts to be a primary reason for the difficulties in 
establishing a strong French presence in North America. 
 Unified colonial leadership was important to the King insomuch as it was a means to 
an end. What was most important was that colonial administrators were unified with the 
Crown in spirit and in action so that they could properly exercise the King’s will in North 
America. The King asserted that once Frontenac and Duchesneau began acting 
harmoniously, they were to ensure that “...the French inhabitants who [were] established in 
the country” were kept “...in complete tranquility, honesty, and to keep them in the right 
possession of all that belongs to them.”211 This seems like a very basic instruction, but some 
analysis reveals that the King was trying to remedy the problems created by illicit trade. 
The inhabitants were supposed to be honest and lawful, and they were to retain that which 
was owed to them, namely, access to the profits of legal trade.212 King Louis XIV also 
instructed that Frontenac and Duchesneau were to “...keep the amount of inhabitants 
present, and even to increase the number of inhabitants every year.”213 In these 
instructions was a reminder of what Frontenac and Duchesneau were intended to do as 
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Governor and Intendant of New France. From the King’s perspective, by busying 
themselves with their rivalry, Frontenac and Duchesneau were losing sight of how they 
were supposed to be exercising the King’s will in New France. King Louis XIV also signified 
that divisions in leadership had the propensity to divide the people. New France already 
had difficulties with men who undermined colonial authority, such as coureurs de bois, and 
administrative divisions only exacerbated this problem.214 
 By the late seventeenth century, King Louis XIV was especially suspicious about 
Frontenac’s character and his efficacy as Governor General. In 1698, Secretary of State 
Louis Phélypeaux, comte de Pontchartrain wrote to Frontenac about the Governor’s choice 
to abandon the forts at Michilimakinac and Fort Miami.215 Abandonment of these forts was 
somewhat unexpected, as Frontenac had argued that they should be maintained amid 
previous inquiries into their usefulness.216 Pontchartrain stated that Frontenac must have 
inevitably decided to abandon them because trading furs was now prohibited at the forts. 
Secretary Pontchartrain also noted that according to Frontenac “...the officers and soldiers 
could not subsist there without trading for furs.”217 Frontenac’s altered stance on the forts 
was alarming to ministers like Pontchartrain, and questions of his fidelity abounded at 
Versailles.218 Again, the problem was not that Frontenac chose to abandon the forts, but as 
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Pontchartrain said, “…His Majesty was surprised to learn that after insisting as you did on 
the necessity of continuing the Missilimaquinat [sic] and Miamis posts You abandoned 
them.”219 The narrative that Governor Frontenac had constructed up to that point – that the 
forts were essential to the success of New France as a whole – began to falter. Once 
Pontchartrain, and by extension the King, learned that the Governor saw value in 
Michilimackinac and Fort Miami primarily for what they offered for the fur trade, 
Frontenac’s intentions came into question. Frontenac was deviating from past claims, and 
his lack of consistency on issues of policy were alarming. Frontenac’s position as Governor 
demanded reliability and consistency, neither of which were qualities that he was 
successfully displaying. 
 The closing of forts in the pays d’en haut did not arouse the suspicions of the French 
Court. Rather, Frontenac’s actions confirmed prior suspicions. Pontchartrain noted that 
Frontenac’s reason for closing the forts “...seemed quite weak to His Majesty,” and implied 
that Frontenac’s motives were already in question.220 Pontchartrain suspected that 
Frontenac’s actions were motivated by personal interest. It became clear to the King and 
French Court that the entire reason Frontenac initially wanted the forts to remain “...was 
rather to satisfy the greed of several officers than the necessity of holding on to the 
Territory that these settlements had been established.”221 The French Court was 
‘confirming’ suspicions that were brought to its attention through reports and 
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correspondence.222 The French Court did not speculate about the greed of officers on its 
own, rather, administrators like Pontchartrain had to rely on letters from New France. As 
historian Kenneth Banks argues, “...informing well and being well informed on transatlantic 
issues comprised the sinews of power for overseas administrators.”223 Canadians were 
entirely foreign to men like Pontchartrain, and navigating the ‘Canadian administration’ 
was difficult to do from France. French courtiers at Versailles could therefore do nothing 
more than to take what was given to them from North American correspondence and try to 
come to logical conclusions based on the information.224 It was up to the French Court to 
disentangle the rivalries in New France, and to decide on the best course of action given 
what was occurring on the ground. This would have been exceedingly difficult as those who 
should have been trusted – the administration – were those who were involved in these 
rivalries. 
 
Beyond Frontenac and Duchesneau 
 Intendant Duchesneau and Governor Frontenac found themselves at the centre of 
plenty of disagreements over colonial policy, but they were not the only New France 
officials embroiled in administrative disagreements. The Marquis de Denonville, who 
served as Governor General between 1685-1689 and was instrumental in New France’s 
Iroquois policy prior to the Great Peace of Montreal in 1701, found himself at odds with 
men like Robert de La Salle. In 1686, La Salle, an accomplished French explorer of the 
                                                          
222 Banks, Chasing Empire across the Sea, 27. Communication was inextricably tied to power in the Atlantic 
world. 
223 Ibid., 30. 
224 Ibid. 
  60  
 
interior, became primary proprietor and Governor of Fort Frontenac (present-day 
Kingston, Ontario), which was situated at the mouth of the Cataraqui River. La Salle had 
helped to establish Fort Frontenac with Governor Frontenac in 1673, making him a good 
choice to administer the fort.225 Although La Salle was Governor of Fort Frontenac, the 
King’s instructions to Governor General Denonville that he “...be careful to do nothing 
contrary to the interests of Sr de la Salle,” would have been an affront to Denonville.226 As 
Governor General of the colony, Denonville would have considered himself superior to La 
Salle in all colonial issues, and would not have believed it to be his responsibility to further 
La Salle’s interests. King Louis XIV’s instructions would have reaffirmed that the King was 
the true authority in New France, as his word was law above all else. These instructions 
also show that Denonville and La Salle frequently disagreed over whose personal and 
professional interests were more imperative to New France’s operation. 
 Antoine de La Mothe Cadillac, who founded Detroit in 1701 and had a close 
relationship with Governor Frontenac, also found himself amid political discord. In 1694 he 
complained to, as New France scholar Joseph Peyser states, “a highly placed person at the 
French court,” about what he thought were the most problematic elements of New 
France.227 Cadillac lamented that there were those at the French Court who misunderstood 
the motives for men who became coureurs de bois, as well as criticized them for their 
disconnectedness from New France, and that they thought men only became coureurs de 
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bois because of “wantonness.”228 Cadillac also urged the French Court “...to persuade 
[Monsieur de Pontchartrain] to reflect on whether an officer can subsist at Michilimackinac 
with the amount of this salary.”229 Cadillac did not openly challenge Minister 
Pontchartrain’s salary policies for officers at Michilimackinac, but did suggest that it was 
troubling and insufficient. Furthermore, Cadillac questioned whether Intendant Champigny 
– who was committed to the King’s policy of halting expansion and fur trading in the pays 
d’en haut – was administering honourably, or was simply acting upon “...some motive 
coming from jealousy.”230 The most significant aspect of Cadillac’s criticisms is that they 
show that New France officials had subsidiary support in their rivalries. Governor 
Frontenac was an aging man near the end of his second term as Governor General in 1694, 
yet the writings of officials such as Cadillac show that Frontenac still had supporters in the 
communications networks of French transatlantic correspondence. 
 Cadillac’s negative opinion of Intendant Champigny continued throughout 1697, at a 
time when Cadillac was attempting to restore the fur trade to Forts Michilimackinac and St. 
Joseph. In a letter to an unidentified superior at the French Court, Cadillac wrote that there 
was disconnectedness between himself and Intendant Champigny, and that the Intendant 
had openly expressed resentment towards him.231 Cadillac wrote that, at times, he would 
receive contrary orders from Intendant Champigny and Governor Frontenac, but in the 
end, he “...always carried [Frontenac’s orders] out assiduously judging that he is the sole 
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person in this country who should explain the King’s intent.”232 The question of whose 
authority should reign supreme was a common underpinning to disagreements and 
administrative divisions in New France during this period. The administrative system of 
New France between 1663 and 1740 was not always unified, and men such as Cadillac 
frequently argued that the Governor General should personify the King in New France. 
Problems typically arose when officials like Intendant Champigny vied for extensions of 
power and authority beyond their official political mandate, or into grey areas where 
official political jurisdictions overlapped.233 
 It would be disingenuous to suggest that Frontenac was the only Governor General 
to receive criticism for his supposed involvement in illicit trade. Philippe de Rigaud, 
Marquis de Vaudreuil, who was Governor between 1703-1725, was accosted by the Council 
of Marine because “...all the Montreal businessmen have lodged a complaint against you for 
the indirect business which is taking place in the upper country.”234 Vaudreuil was not one 
to take criticisms lightly, however, and wrote back to the Council “...that it is extremely sad 
for me to be exposed in this way to this kind of calumny because of the Permissiveness 
with which the Council accepts unfounded Complaints from unscrupulous people.”235 
Administrative discord was typical of New France’s political environment during this 
period. It was consistently difficult for the French Court at Versailles to substantiate any 
claims made for or against administrators across the Atlantic, as there were too many 
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contradictory accounts in the information pouring into Versailles in the form of letters and 
reports. Men such as Governor Vaudreuil, and Governor Frontenac before him, often had to 
present their case for legitimacy and fidelity of their own accord. The King’s acceptance of 
their testimony was not always assured, and administrative strength therefore remained in 
a state of flux. The recall to France of both Frontenac and Duchesneau in 1682 was a 
testament to this administrative weakness, and marked the culmination of a long-standing 
rivalry between the Governor and Intendant.236 
 
Lasting Effects of Administrative Disunity 
 Disagreements over the handling of illicit trade formed the basis of colonial 
rivalries, but they were expressed in more substantial ways. For example, Frontenac and 
Duchesneau commonly tried to undermine each other’s efficacy. In 1682, Duchesneau 
questioned Frontenac’s dealings with the Iroquois, and a proposed trip to Fort 
Frontenac.237 Duchesneau stated that Frontenac “...did not think it right to go to Fort 
Frontenac in the month of June last, as the Iroquois requested.”238 Duchesneau’s comments 
were a direct criticism of Frontenac’s lack of follow-through in regard to Indigenous 
diplomacy.239 According to Duchesneau, Frontenac’s absence in this instance denied the 
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Iroquois “...justice which you had promised them against the Kiskakons.”240 Duchesneau 
wanted to show Frontenac’s incompetence in dealing with the Iroquois, a strong 
confederacy that had to be appeased.241 Reporting on Frontenac’s absence might have been 
the only way that word would reach Versailles. Frontenac himself would obviously not 
report that he failed to follow up on Iroquois requests. But this is also a showcase of 
colonial rivalries in effect. Duchesneau went out of his way to question Frontenac’s 
decisions as a leader, specifically regarding French-Indigenous diplomacy. 
 Duchesneau did not hesitate to surmise the possible consequences of Frontenac’s 
inaction. The Illinois, an Algonquian-speaking peoples who were allies of the French, were 
facing Iroquois incursions into their territory in the western Ohio Valley. By Frontenac not 
diplomatically dealing with the Iroquois, the Iroquois assumed that the French were weak 
and not willing to defend their Algonquian-speaking allies throughout the Great Lakes and 
Ohio Valley; as Intendant Duchesneau stated, this would cause the Iroquois to “...not doubt 
but that you were abandoning the Illinois to them.”242 Duchesneau was goading Frontenac 
into action, doubting his decisions, and also iterated that the Iroquois would think “...that 
you would be pleased that they should themselves treat the Kiskakons as they deserve 
since they would have reason to believe that you would put yourself to no more trouble 
about it.”243 Again, this was pure speculation by Duchesneau, and while he was basing his 
assumptions on perceptions he may have had of Iroquois actions, there is no way that 
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Duchesneau could have been assured of this outcome.244 Finally, Duchesneau suggested 
that Frontenac knew the consequences of letting the Iroquois have their way with the 
Illinois and Kiskakons even better than himself.245 By reminding Frontenac that ‘he knows 
the consequences of his actions,’ Duchesneau was bringing attention to Frontenac’s 
ineptitude. Correspondence between rivals like Duchesneau and Frontenac reveal a contest 
for power in New France that adversely influenced effective governance of the colony. 
 Although disagreements abounded between Duchesneau and Frontenac, 
Duchesneau remained hesitant to completely disregard Frontenac’s station as Governor. In 
speaking of the need for Frontenac to meet with the Iroquois, Duchesneau conceded that 
“...it seems to me that it is difficult for you to refuse it in the present conjuncture,” primarily 
because “…we can hope for nothing from France.”246 Duchesneau was suggesting a 
commitment to cooperating with Frontenac as a cohesive governing body in New France, 
not because he wanted to, but because he had little choice.247 Duchesneau’s dissatisfaction 
with Frontenac’s behaviour and decisions continued throughout this half-hearted 
cooperation, as he stressed that “…you ought to do nothing unworthy of your character,” 
and that Frontenac should “…keep your dignity and your authority intact.”248 A sense of 
dislike remained in Duchesneau and Frontenac’s correspondence, even when they 
seemingly supported each other. The incongruence between Frontenac and Duchesneau 
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was pervasive, and their disagreements and rivalry influenced nearly everything that New 
France’s Intendant and Governor tried to accomplish.249 
 
The Church Weighs In 
 Given the Church’s importance to early modern French culture, its place in these 
colonial rivalries cannot be overlooked. New France church historian Daniel A. Scalberg 
notes that by the early eighteenth century, high-ranking clergymen such as the Bishop of 
Quebec City, Jean Baptiste de Saint-Vallier, reported that groups such as the Jesuits 
continually faced problems in their missionary efforts.250 Saint-Vallier blamed the fur trade 
for sabotaging Jesuit missionary efforts, and claimed that as much as six per cent of the 
New France population were drawn to trade brandy and rum for furs.251 Historian Joseph 
Peyser realized the importance of the Catholic Church to New France diplomatic policy, and 
wrote that “[the Canadian Bishop’s] exhortation to the Council of the Marine that France 
move quickly to forestall its enemy’s designs suggests the dual religious and political role of 
the Church in New France.”252 The Council of the Marine itself stated in 1717 that “...the 
Jesuit Fathers are the ones who best succeed in the Missions and are most capable of 
leading the Indians. It is certain that they serve both Religion and the State equally well.”253 
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Clearly there was recognition from the French Court that the Catholic Orders were crucial 
to French-Indigenous diplomacy in North America, even if some missionaries were not 
always afforded the support they required. Given the influential position of the Church in 
New France there is little wonder that its leaders found themselves entangled in the 
quagmire of New France politics. 
Influential clergymen occasionally had to embroil themselves in colonial politics, 
due in part to the compromised position of some of the Church’s missionary efforts. In 
1682, Jesuit Father Lamberville appealed to Governor Frontenac in response to 
defamations of his character.254 Lamberville stated “...that surely some person has 
slandered us to you on two or three occasions,” and concluded that “...I have never thought 
of anything but furthering, with [my] feeble power, all the good intentions that you have 
had and still have toward Canada.”255 That Lamberville chose to appeal to Governor 
Frontenac shows that he sought favor with the person who most directly represented the 
King in New France. Colonial politics were so important to the Church’s ability to safeguard 
its interests that Lamberville had no choice but to become involved. 
 A 1718 memorial by Father Joseph-François Lafitau shows an attempt by a Jesuit 
missionary to the Kahnawake Mohawks to navigate New France politics. The memorial 
itself was addressed to members of the Sovereign Council, and was concerned with the sale 
of liquor to Indigenous peoples whom the Jesuits hoped to Christianize. Lafitau wrote this 
appeal because he hoped that it would “...induce the council to give such precise orders for 
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preventing this traffic – which is almost the sole obstacle to the labors of the 
missionaries.”256 The Jesuits – and to some extent the entire Catholic Church in New France 
– had a stake in colonial politics, as decisions and compromises made by the upper 
echelons of government impacted their success in their missionary activities. This seems 
especially true, as Lafitau later requested “...that Messieurs the Governors will be obliged to 
execute those orders; and that no one will dare to evade them, as has been done in the 
past.”257 According to Lafitau’s estimation, management of illicit commerce had been 
slipping out of control. He and clergymen like him were losing confidence in the colonial 
government’s ability to adequately govern New France. New France’s administration did 
not always act as one cohesive unit, and different groups did whatever was necessary to 
ensure that their own interests were realized.258 Some Jesuits felt obligated to involve 
themselves in the political rivalries, trading insults, and the poisonous colonial 
administrative environment. Embroiling oneself in colonial politics seemed to be the only 
way, or at least the most effective way, to ensure that one’s goals and aspirations were met. 
 Church leadership in New France was typically unable to separate its missionary 
activities from the secular decisions of the administration and French Court. This is 
highlighted in a 1721 missive from the Marine Council to Governor Vaudreuil that 
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concerns, among other things, King Louis XV’s control over the Church. Absolute monarchy 
in France was by divine right of Kings, appointed by God, and sanctioned in some ways by 
the Pope. The Church of France, or Gallican Church, somewhat restrained the Pope’s 
authority in France in favour of the bishops and temporal ruler.259 French historian 
Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie argues that the French State was almost as much of a divine 
creation as the Church. Ladurie writes that the French clergy were to be submissive to the 
King, and that this was one of the most profound roots of absolutism.260 The Council wrote 
that it disapproved of the marriage of Vaudreuil’s nephew without the King’s approval. The 
Council argued that, as absolute monarch, the King should have a measure of control over 
the Church in New France.261 Additionally, the Council wrote that “...nor did He approve of 
the Bishop of Quebec’s celebrating this marriage,” which suggests that the King and Marine 
Council believed that the King should have direct involvement in Church decisions. The 
Council also expressed that it approved of the request for additional Jesuit missionaries to 
be sent to New France, and that the King would do his best to see the request realized.262 
Even if the Church had wanted to distance itself from New France politics, it was firmly 
enmeshed in the designs of the French Empire by default. Church leaders like the Bishop of 
Quebec or the Temporal Head of the Jesuits of New France had to not only concede to the 
King’s policies, but at times had to rely on them. Much like France itself, spiritual and 
temporal decision-making were inextricably entwined in New France. For Catholic Orders 
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like the Jesuits to succeed in their mission of Indigenous Christianization, they had to 
realize their place in New France politics, and what that meant for their own ambitions. 
 
Conclusion 
Rivalry and competition ultimately defined colonial politics in New France between 
1663 and 1740. Not only did this environment of political disunity influence decisions 
regarding colonial government, it also dictated how these decisions were made. 
Competition and rivalry among colonial administrators created problems for New France, 
and hindered the implementation of the King’s imperial designs for North America. The 
more time that New France officials devoted to navigating the political realities of the 
colony, the less time they could spend on adequately forming New France into a self-
sufficient, economically profitable colony. Legitimate, stabilized fur trading was 
substantially hindered by the politicking of New France administrators, which thus hurt 
France’s ability to maintain strong relations with Indigenous nations in the interior. The 
question of what to do about coureurs de bois and the illicit trade dominated a significant 
portion of colonial discussion and correspondence. The illicit trade undermined legal 
trading, and disagreements over how to manage illicit fur trading commonly caused 
administrative disunity. The way that colonial officials handled illicit trade was a focal 
point that emphasized differences in governing style, individual aspirations, and loyalty to 
the King. There was, however, the potential for administrative disagreements between 
colonial officials based on social origins and status, individual desires for power, and 
personal dislike. Administrative discord was exacerbated by illicit trading throughout New 
France as colonial officials struggled to agree over how the trade could be curbed. Illicit fur 
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trading was therefore a persistent problem for New France administrators that continually 
hampered their ability to govern according to the King’s wishes. 
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Chapter 3: Fort Frontenac – A Case Study of Illicit Trading and Administration on the 
Frontier 
 
In the summer of 1673, Governor Frontenac began construction of Fort Frontenac 
with the express purpose of increasing colonial defence and establishing a commercial 
centre for voyageurs and Indigenous traders. Fort Frontenac was situated at the mouth of 
the Cataraqui River on Lake Ontario, and is the now the site of the Canadian city of 
Kingston, Ontario.263 The fort stood for nearly one hundred years after its construction, and 
went through periods of occupation and abandonment that largely depended on its 
usefulness to the Crown. The Crown was frequently skeptical of Fort Frontenac’s utility, 
due to reports of the questionable behaviour of the fort’s administrators, as well as the 
dubious nature of the fort’s imperial benefits. Colonial Intendants under King Louis XIV 
such as Jacques Duchesneau and Jean Bochart de Champigny and Governors like the 
Marquis de Denonville and Joseph-Antoine de La Barre argued against maintaining Fort 
Frontenac because of its reputation for corruption.264 Contrarily, Governor Frontenac’s 
personal interests often aligned with voyageurs and coureurs de bois who utilized Fort 
Frontenac, and therefore the Governor resisted calls from the Royal Court to have the fort 
dismantled. Governor Frontenac and supporters such as Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac and 
Robert de La Salle continually advocated to preserve Fort Frontenac, keeping the fort 
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relevant throughout Frontenac’s governorships.265 This chapter will explore Fort 
Frontenac as a case study for examining the corruption of high-ranking colonial officials 
and their involvement in the New France illicit fur trade. 
An examination of corruption and illicit trade out of Fort Frontenac shows real 
instances of administrative inefficiencies and incompetence, proof that political disunity 
was not simply an abstract notion expressed in imperial correspondence. Contrary reports 
about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of Fort Frontenac displays the discord within New 
France. It was the level of uncertainty and lawfulness of places like Fort Frontenac that 
made Kings, councils, and first ministers come to understand some of the problems of 
governing an overseas empire. Legal uncertainties in New France also illustrate the 
clandestine nature of coureurs de bois and the illicit fur trade, as well as the difficulty in 
constructing an empire based on commerce. Military forts in New France’s hinterland were 
administrative nightmares because the forts afforded individual stakeholders 
opportunities to make large sums of money through illegitimate means. Above all, Fort 
Frontenac’s ambiguous status as both hub for illegal trade and legitimate imperial space 
makes it useful for examining the intersection between colonial administration and the 
illicit fur trade. 
 
Beginnings 
Early reports from New France to Versailles suggest that support for the 
construction of Fort Frontenac was initially widespread. Some clergymen, particularly 
                                                          
265 Leopold Lamontagne, ed., Richard A. Preston, trans., Royal Fort Frontenac, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1958), 131, “Memoir to the Gentlemen Partners of the Society Invested with the Farm and Commerce 
of Canada, on Ways to Prevent Frauds in Beavers,” Quebec, 1683. 
  74  
 
Jesuit missionaries, saw the value of Fort Frontenac to their own goals of Indigenous 
conversion.266 Missionaries were primarily interested in royal fort construction because of 
the potential that forts had for bringing Indigenous peoples closer to centres of French 
culture and Christian conversion, such as Catholic missions along the St. Lawrence River.267 
Missionaries understood that providing Indigenous peoples opportunities to trade 
improved French commerce and French-Indigenous diplomacy, as they commonly lived 
and operated within Indigenous communities.268 By 1671, missionaries came to the 
understanding that a royal fort “…could obstruct the Dutch trade,” and therefore the 
Iroquois (Dutch allies) would be “…compelled to go hunting in the northern countries 
where there [was] a prodigious quantity of beaver, otter, etc., and to cross Lake Ontario for 
that purpose.”269 The majority of missionaries certainly cared more about the fur trade’s 
ability to bring Indigenous peoples into the Christian sphere than what an increase in trade 
meant for the French Empire. Many Catholic missionaries in New France felt that the illicit 
fur trade resulted in the spread of the liquor consumption and immoral behaviour, and 
therefore despised its influence on Indigenous communities. Royal forts with military 
officers and soldiers were seen as a deterrent to illicit trade and the social ills that came 
with it.270 Missionaries therefore had their own reason for supporting the construction of 
Fort Frontenac outside of the imperial implications for France in North America. 
                                                          
266 Leopold Lamontagne, ed., Richard A. Preston, trans., Royal Fort Frontenac, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1958), 103, “Memorandum by a Missionary,” Quebec, 1671. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Scalberg, “The French-Amerindian Religious Encounter,” 104. 
269 Leopold Lamontagne, ed., Richard A. Preston, trans., Royal Fort Frontenac, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1958), 103, “Memorandum by a Missionary,” Quebec, 1671. 
270 Scalberg, “The French-Amerindian Religious Encounter,” 104, 105. Efforts to ‘tame’ and moralize illegal 
traders by missionaries alone were largely unsuccessful. Illegal trading was a problematic obstacle to 
missionary efforts due to the proximity that coureurs de bois and Indigenous peoples often lived to Catholic 
missions. 
  75  
 
 Governor Frontenac himself was the person with the largest stake in the success or 
failure of Fort Frontenac. The Governor lobbied for imperial support for its construction, 
and claimed to First Minister Colbert that he would “…spare neither care nor trouble, nor 
even my life if necessary, to attempt to do something to please you and to acknowledge the 
obligations which I have owed you all my life.”271 Frontenac intentionally used language 
that would appeal to Colbert’s sense of French dignity and desire for French global 
influence.272 Frontenac asked Colbert, “…whether, despite our weakness, we should not 
begin to set up a post there,” implying that the French Empire was losing ground in the race 
for power in North America. Finally, Frontenac claimed that by erecting a fort at the mouth 
of the Cataraqui River, the military “…would also be a support for the mission which the 
Gentlemen of the Montreal Seminary already have at Quintay.”273 By his account, Fort 
Frontenac would help spread French Catholicism among the Indigenous peoples of North 
America. Frontenac was still on good terms with the Royal Court at Versailles in 1672, and 
he could plea his case for a fort by appealing to the grandeur of King and empire. Over the 
following decades the political climate in New France changed and Frontenac’s motives 
came under scrutiny.274  
 The Comte de Frontenac initially garnered a substantial amount of prestige from his 
namesake fort, regardless of his initial intentions for constructing it. Frontenac was lauded 
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for his oratory skills prior to the fort’s assembly, which later gave him greater negotiating 
power when he needed to advocate for the fort’s continuation. Jesuit Father Lamberville 
stated in the fall of 1673 “…that if [Frontenac] had not won [the Iroquois] chiefs at 
Katarakoui [sic] by [his] generosity and by [his] so very great affability, we believe that the 
French who are here would be either dead or chased out of the country.”275 According to 
Lamberville, the Dutch were making inroads into the destruction of the French, and it was 
only through Frontenac’s will that the French were saved.276 The praise heaped on 
Frontenac is worth exploring, and the rhetoric meant to lift up the Governor may have been 
somewhat misleading. French colonial historian Jon Parmenter argues that New France 
administrators were – and had to be – exceptionally adept at intertwining French interests 
with Iroquois interests, who often allied with France’s enemies such as the English.277 By 
that estimation, Governor Frontenac was simply doing what French colonial administrators 
did out of necessity, and that he was not, as Father Lamberville suggested, going beyond his 
call of duty. The implication is that Father Lamberville was purposefully ingratiating 
himself to Frontenac, which seems like politically prudent maneuvering given Frontenac’s 
prestige both in Canada and France in 1673.278 Lamberville was a Jesuit father, not a 
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politician, and his actions show that all New France institutions, even the Church, had to 
deal with the politics of colonial governance. 
 
Royal Responses to Fort Frontenac 
 Initial reactions from France to Governor Frontenac’s construction of a fort on the 
Cataraqui River were tempered. Just a year after Fort Frontenac was established, First 
Minister Colbert expressed his general displeasure towards Governor Frontenac for its 
construction.279 This response from Colbert, and by extension the King, had less to do with 
the fort itself, and more to do with Frontenac’s conduct as Governor.280 Minister Colbert 
deviated from a discussion on the fort to note “...that His Majesty’s intent is that you should 
not make long voyages up the St. Lawrence River, nor even that in the future the colonists 
should spread out as much as they have done in the past.”281 The minister pressed 
Frontenac “...to crowd [the colonists] together, and to group them and settle them in towns 
and villages,” to better populate Canada.282 Minister Colbert wanted nothing more than for 
the Governor to oversee settlement, and expressed that it was  
…more expedient for [the King’s] service that you should apply yourself to 
have cleared and settled those vast fertile places . . . rather than that you 
should think of discoveries in the interior of the country, so remote that they 
can never be inhabited or possessed by Frenchmen.283  
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Colbert also reiterated that “...His Majesty is always of the opinion that you can and must 
leave the Indians free to bring their furs without putting yourself to the trouble of going so 
far to seek them.”284 Colbert wanted compact French agricultural settlement, much like the 
English had in New England and Virginia. Frontenac understood the realities on the 
ground, such as the importance of meeting Indigenous peoples to establish allies and 
secure the colony, and that the fur trade was going to be a drain on the population. At the 
very least, Frontenac was going to make the necessities of North American trade and 
diplomacy work for the colony in some manner. 
 Immediately following the construction of Fort Frontenac, Governor Frontenac sent 
letters to France to assuage any fears or doubts that the King might have had regarding the 
fort’s utility. The Governor attributed a lot of his success to Fort Frontenac, particularly 
that which concerned French-Indigenous negotiation and colonial defence.285 Frontenac 
took opportunities to wholeheartedly espouse his achievements by claiming that “…[the 
Iroquois] have shown themselves in so great submission, so touched by the good 
treatment, the gifts and feasts that I made for them, that there is nobody in this country 
who is not surprised to see them in this disposition.” To this the Governor added that 
…the establishment of Fort Frontenac has produced the effects which I have 
noticed above, and the safety of all the missionaries . . . It has had a further 
effect on the trade, which is no less advantageous for the country; for never 
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since the French have been in Canada have so many Indians come down to 
Montreal as we have seen this summer.286 
 
Governor Frontenac summarized his thoughts on his namesake fort by stating that “...[the 
colony’s] security, and the preservation of the fur trade, depends upon the retention of this 
post.”287 In the ensuing years, men such as Intendant Duchesneau chastised Governor 
Frontenac for ignoring the Iroquois, and not satisfying his duties at Fort Frontenac.288 What 
is clear is that Frontenac deeply desired royal support immediately following the 
construction of Fort Frontenac. Unchecked illicit fur trading out of Fort Frontenac in later 
years suggests that Governor Frontenac had more selfish reasons for lobbying for 
construction of the fort, and puts the integrity of his early letters into question. 
 Governor Frontenac was particularly successful at asserting to the Crown that Fort 
Frontenac benefitted New France. By 1675, Frontenac’s influence on Minister Colbert was 
clear, as the Minister stated that “…the post which you have established on Lake Ontario 
will doubtless bring that effect [of maintaining peace with the Iroquois and other 
nations].”289 Less than a year after questioning Frontenac’s leadership in New France and 
alluding to the frivolity of building Fort Frontenac, Colbert’s effusive support for the fort 
seems out of place.290 However, Colbert did an about-face and praised Frontenac for the 
creation of the fort, which he agreed would “…increase the fur trade, which is the only 
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means of strengthening and enriching the Colony.”291 As Minister of the Marine and 
Colonies, Colbert was responsible for building France’s empire and had a vested interest in 
seeing New France succeed.292 Colbert accepted Frontenac’s reported claims at face value; 
the Royal Court’s perceptions and knowledge about happenings in the ‘New World’ came 
overwhelmingly from officers, officials, and agents on the ground.293 It was therefore 
possible for colonial officials like Frontenac to put their personal interests above those of 
the empire. Royal servants at Versailles could not easily discern what was accurate and 
real, and what was a fabrication. 
 Royal reactions to colonial initiatives were fluid and ever-changing, and Governor 
Frontenac’s fort is a perfect example. In one instance, Minister Colbert would praise 
Frontenac’s work, and in the next, the King and Colbert would remind the Governor that 
“...you must always be careful to crowd the settlements together as much as possible in 
order to increase the number of people and so that they may be more united and more 
easily assembled for defence.”294 The Crown supported Frontenac’s endeavours to some 
extent, with King Louis XIV noting that “…I do not doubt at all that the post which you have 
set up last year on Lake Ontario is advantageous, and that it has attracted a great number of 
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Indians into the French settlements.”295 The French Court was still conscious of small 
deviations that the Governor was making from the design of colonial settlement.296 While 
the King granted Frontenac some latitude to carry his own projects to fruition, the Crown 
ultimately had a goal in mind as to what New France should look like and how it should be 
developed. The construction of Fort Frontenac did not necessarily align with those goals. As 
long as positive assessments of Fort Frontenac flowed into Versailles, however, the fort 
could remain active and Frontenac could stay in the King’s good graces. 
 
A House of Cards: Falsehoods on the Frontier 
 Favour for Governor Frontenac’s project on the Cataraqui fell within the first decade 
of the fort’s existence. Parties interested in the wellbeing of New France’s farms and 
commerce noted in 1683 that the fort: 
…was established in the year 1673 by M. the Count Frontenac, purportedly 
for the security of the country, but in fact for trading with the Iroquois, to 
serve as a refuge and entrepot for the coureurs de bois scattered among all 
the Ottawa nations, and to form a trading connection in beavers with the 
Dutch and the English of Albany and Manhattan.297 
 
This quotation alludes to Frontenac’s personal interests in illegal trade and his deviation 
from royal instructions. The notion that coureurs de bois were “scattered” among 
Indigenous nations and therefore kept Indigenous peoples in the woods and away from 
centres of trade was an obvious affront to the instructions of King Louis XIV to bring 
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Indigenous peoples into populated areas, and to maintain a centralized population.298 
Historian Eric Hinderaker argues that coureurs de bois could be valuable to French-
Indigenous relations because they bridged cultural and societal gaps between the two 
peoples.299 Forming cultural and economic ties with Indigenous peoples through the use of 
coureurs de bois was not, however, the stated goal that Governor Frontenac gave when he 
proposed the construction of Fort Frontenac.300 Considering Governor Frontenac’s obvious 
transgressions from his original plans for Fort Frontenac, his complete innocence in these 
failings is doubtful. 
 King Louis XIV’s inquiries and ordinances in the mid-1680s regarding Fort 
Frontenac expose the disorder that characterized the fort in the decade following its 
construction. The King scolded Joseph Antoine de La Barre, Governor of New France 
between 1682 and 1685, by stating that he had unlawfully taken possession of Fort 
Frontenac away from Sieur de la Salle.301 King Louis XIV accused La Barre of “…[driving] 
away the men who were there under [La Salle’s] orders, that the lands which are attached 
to [the fort] remain uncultivated, the greater part of the animals being dead, that you have 
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even permitted the Iroquois to seize him as an enemy of the colony.”302 The King also then 
called for a quick resolution to the rampant disorder at Fort Frontenac.303 Although these 
were serious claims, the King did appreciate La Barre’s situation, and even insinuated that 
there had to be some measure of dishonesty in what he had been told about how bad the 
situation at the fort truly was. King Louis XIV suggested that there was the possibility that 
La Salle had simply abandoned Fort Frontenac, as La Barre had attested, but emphasized 
the seriousness of the claims against La Barre.304 What is evident is that the King had to 
concern himself with speculation and hearsay regarding his New France administrators. 
The continual efforts of New France officials to undermine each other’s authority meant 
that the King had to rule and make decisions without a complete picture of what was 
happening in the colony. Regardless of which party was being truthful, the original purpose 
of Fort Frontenac was already faltering. The promises and goals set out by Governor 
Frontenac in 1672 for what his namesake fort would offer to New France were 
crumbling.305 The King received reports in 1684 that the lands surrounding Fort Frontenac 
were derelict, and that the fort’s utility as a centre of trade and diplomacy was 
questionable. 
Governor La Barre’s responses to King Louis XIV in November 1684 further 
complicated the question of Fort Frontenac’s leadership and the post’s state of disrepair. La 
Barre was very blunt with the King, stating “…it is a strange bravado – the falsehood that 
Sieur de la Salle has had to recite to your Majesty – that I have despoiled him of his Fort 
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Frontenac.”306 In his pioneering work on colonialism and Euro-Indigenous relations The 
Middle Ground, historian Richard White argues that contrary to coureurs de bois and other 
illegitimate traders, La Salle was a man of good standing, with the official backing of the 
Crown.307 La Salle’s reputation was brought into question when La Barre revealed that La 
Salle lied to the King in stating that La Barre “...despoiled him of his Fort Frontenac and that 
I have completely mined and destroyed it.”308 The French Court was in a difficult position, 
as the nature of transatlantic correspondence in the colonial period meant that reports 
from feuding officials would reach Versailles sporadically. Hesitancy among New France 
administrators to admit their mistakes and take responsibility for colonial failings 
precluded effective governing of places like Fort Frontenac. A sort of “court politicking” 
was taking place on New France’s frontier, where administrators vied for Court favour 
through deceit and underhandedness. It is difficult to discern a clear picture of what was 
occurring, except that there was a continuous battle of personalities being waged through 
correspondence. 
The Marquis de Denonville became Governor of New France in 1685, and like his 
predecessor La Barre, maintained that La Salle was economically and politically corrupt. La 
Salle was typical of men that operated out of Fort Frontenac, who sacrificed colonial profits 
in favour of personal earnings garnered through unlicensed trade. Denonville attested to La 
Salle’s individual gains in the trade out of Fort Frontenac, and claimed that personal 
interest was the ruin of legitimate trade and strong connections with the Indigenous 
                                                          
306 Leopold Lamontagne, ed., Richard A. Preston, trans., Royal Fort Frontenac, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1958), 132, “La Barre to Louis XIV,” Quebec, Nov. 13, 1684. 
307 White, The Middle Ground, 58. 
308 Leopold Lamontagne, ed., Richard A. Preston, trans., Royal Fort Frontenac, (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 1958), 132, “La Barre to Louis XIV,” Quebec, Nov. 13, 1684. 
  85  
 
peoples around the fort.309 Historian Jon Parmenter contradicts Denonville’s argument, 
however, and contends that illegal trade was a unifying activity between French and 
Indigenous peoples.310 Inconsistences between Denonville’s assertions and Parmenter’s 
argument suggests that there may have been a difference in how lawful and illicit trade 
were understood across different levels of administration. Denonville might have 
understood illicit trade to be a destructive force, while La Salle might have thought the 
contrary. Historian Catherine Desbarats posits a more plausible argument for why trade 
was conducted legally or illegally in places like Fort Frontenac by maintaining that legal 
trading was not always economically feasible because legal trade revenues did not match 
the costs of upholding Indigenous alliances through gift-diplomacy.311 To men like 
Governor Denonville and La Barre before him – royal representatives of His Majesty’s will – 
La Salle’s engagement in unlicensed trade was an affront to authority.312 Like those before 
him, Denonville used strategic word choice in an effort to advance his agenda.313 The 
Governor was intentionally vague in saying that there were “many” complaints about the 
trade and that the goods were “too expensive” to convince Indigenous peoples to trade.314 
Denonville was able to allow whoever he was communicating with to imagine the worst 
possible scenario by being vague and unspecific. In this case, Governor Denonville was 
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communicating with the Marquis de Seignelay, the eldest son of the late finance minister 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert. Seignelay, like his father before him, was Naval Secretary under King 
Louis XIV, and therefore had a vested interest in the success of New France. The attitudes 
that Governor Denonville had towards men like La Salle (illegal traders) and places like 
Fort Frontenac (locales where both legal and illicit trade occurred) show the fort to be 
representative of the larger and more widespread problem of illicit trade in New France. 
 
The Royal Utility of Fort Frontenac 
During his first term as Governor, Frontenac appealed to King Louis XIV for supplies 
and military reinforcements by attempting to persuade the King of the fort’s usefulness. 
Regarding the Iroquois, Frontenac claimed in 1681 that “...I alone have kept these Indians 
in a spirit of obedience, of quiet, and of peace, by a little skill and tact.”315 Frontenac 
anguished that fostering relations with Indigenous peoples was difficult because he was 
“...deprived of everything,” but that he was still able to do so commendably due to his apt 
leadership and the benefit of Fort Frontenac.316 At any rate, Frontenac still appealed for 
military reinforcements from the Crown, as he understood the limitations of his supposed 
exceptional diplomacy.317 The Crown listened to and considered these appeals, which 
indicates that at least initially, there was some imperial utility to Fort Frontenac, regardless 
of whether illicit activity occurred.318 By Governor Frontenac’s estimation, Fort Frontenac 
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was crucial to upholding French-Iroquois peace.319 Frontenac was aware of the colony’s 
weaknesses compared to Indigenous nations and other colonial powers, and therefore saw 
the need for a military presence in North America’s interior. The Governor implored the 
King for support. Frontenac might have had his own motives, but as the King’s 
representative on the ground in New France, he was best positioned to determine colonial 
needs for defence. The issue of colonial defence became problematic when Frontenac’s 
recommendations and those of another of the King’s representatives on the ground in New 
France (the Intendant), did not align, and even contradicted each other. 
 
Fort Frontenac and the Beaver Wars 
 The Iroquois (Beaver) Wars of the seventeenth century were crucial in shaping New 
France and French imperialism in North America. Historians William Starna and José 
António Brandão argue that European trade goods and the beaver trade enflamed pre-
existing rivalries between Indigenous peoples throughout the Great Lakes region.320 The 
actions of Fort Frontenac’s administrators during these wars show that they would at times 
set aside their desires for personal profit in favor of conforming to the needs of the King 
and empire. An assembly meeting of Jesuits, fort commanders, and administrators in 1682 
concluded that New France was much more prepared for war with the Iroquois than it 
previously had been. The assembly commended the benefits of Fort Frontenac and French 
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traders and explorers, positively explaining that “…the way to Fort Frontenac lies open, so 
that in forty hours we can fall upon the Senecas.”321 The assembly also stated that there 
would need to be an increase in military support from the King, but that Fort Frontenac 
would be well-suited to garrison French troops in case of war.322 In critical situations, such 
as when conflict with the Iroquois loomed, men of all pursuits could come together to form 
an assembly in the interest of colonial defence. Missionaries and traders never forwent 
their own personal interests completely, however, as the security of New France was 
paramount to ventures such as missionary conversion and profitable trade. 
Troop and officer preoccupations with trade quickly began to cause problems for 
French military efficiency during the Beaver Wars. In July 1684, Intendant Jacques de 
Meulles complained that barques (sailing vessels) from Fort Frontenac that were needed 
for transporting wartime provisions were unavailable because of trade, which caused 
inefficient transportation schedules.323 King Louis XIV commented a year later that Fort 
Frontenac was important “…for the protection of the trade of his subjects, for standing 
against the Iroquois, and for being in position to attack them as soon as it will be thought 
convenient.”324 As De Meulles was focused on protecting New France from Iroquois attack 
in 1684, doubling transportation times because of commerce was reprehensible. De 
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Meulles lamented that before conflict began with the Iroquois in the 1680s, Fort Frontenac 
was well-provisioned and ready for war; after aggressions erupted, the fort was 
suspiciously understocked.325 Inefficiencies and corruption that stemmed from Fort 
Frontenac hindered the war effort against the Iroquois, and the true interest of those 
running Fort Frontenac was trade, not colonial defence.326 For the leadership at Fort 
Frontenac, contributing to the French cause through garrisoning and provisioning was 
useful only insofar that it helped to support trade.327 
 
Dismantling Fort Frontenac 
 By November 1686, the Marquis de Denonville was tired of the inefficiencies of Fort 
Frontenac and its problematic status as a royal fort. Denonville claimed that even though 
the fort could only garrison fifty men, it was incredibly expensive to maintain.328 To an 
administrator like Denonville, who strove to stop corruption within the colonial leadership, 
the drain of maintaining Fort Frontenac would have been incredibly frustrating. It had been 
twelve years since Minister Colbert instructed Governor Frontenac to cultivate the lands 
around Fort Frontenac in order to ensure its sustainability; Frontenac had failed to do this 
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by the time he was recalled to France in 1682.329 Denonville still complained that “…it is 
very distressing that the lands there are not better so that this post could maintain 
itself.”330 Denonville admitted, however, that he did not know the lands around Fort 
Frontenac well enough, and therefore could not easily identify a plausible solution to the 
problem.331 There was a disconnect between certain French officials who may have 
petitioned for better administrative and political organization within New France, but who 
were unfamiliar with its inner workings. Contrary to those who came after him, Frontenac 
was very much a hands-on Governor. He voyaged to the pays d’en haut and Fort Frontenac, 
experienced firsthand the landscape and climate, and met with various Indigenous peoples. 
His successors, who did not take this approach, were disadvantaged by their lack of 
familiarity with the colony’s hinterland.332 Without Comte de Frontenac as Governor of 
New France, Fort Frontenac had little chance to survive as either a military garrison or 
centre of trade, and was ultimately abandoned under the Governorship of Denonville in 
1689.333 
 The Comte de Frontenac once again became Governor of New France in 1689, and 
with that, went on a campaign to re-establish Fort Frontenac. Frontenac hoped that under 
his renewed leadership, the fort could attain the status that it had had during his first 
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tenure as Governor. Just three years after his return to the position of Governor, and 
knowing full well his opinion was in the minority, Frontenac proposed “…that when the 
opportunity occurs I would not know any greater service to do for the King, or anything 
more profitable for the colony, than to re-establish this post.”334 Governor Frontenac made 
the same arguments as before, that Fort Frontenac was crucial for colonial defence, for 
waging war, and for trade.335 Governor Denonville had seen no use for the fort and 
recognized his ignorance in the potential military and economic value of Fort Frontenac. 
Frontenac used his predecessor’s ignorance to his own advantage, hoping that it would 
compel the Crown to see his superior direction.336 Governor Frontenac claimed that his 
detractors had personal interest in closing Fort Frontenac and in disparaging his name.337 
Frontenac attested that contrary to his critics, he had zero personal interest in reopening 
Fort Frontenac.338 Governor Frontenac was successful in his appeals, and the fort was 
reinstituted to resume its prior activities. 
Fort Frontenac’s proposed reconstitution was largely criticized following the start of 
Governor Frontenac’s second term. Intendant Jean Bochart de Champigny considered the 
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fort “useless,” as its garrison was too weak to operate as any sort of military deterrent.339 
Champigny stated that he wished Governor Frontenac had never had it re-established, and 
considered the garrison that was at Fort Frontenac to be an absolute waste of valuable 
resources.340 As much as the King wanted Fort Frontenac dismantled and abandoned, he 
continually left the final decision to do so with the Governor. In 1696, King Louis XIV urged 
Governor Frontenac to dismantle the fort for the second time, due to its uselessness and 
rampant corruption. The King also cited that the fort was too often deviating from its 
principal aim of colonial defence.341 King Louis XIV again had to suggest that the fort be 
abandoned in 1697 and 1698, as Governor Frontenac disagreed with the French Court 
about the fort’s usefulness. However, the King remained firm in an address to Frontenac 
and Intendant Champigny in 1697 that he ultimately wanted to leave preservation of Fort 
Frontenac to the Governor’s discretion.342 Just six months before Governor Frontenac died, 
the King stated that he did not believe that Fort Frontenac was any more valuable than his 
other forts, and that its cost far outweighed its value.343 Although Fort Frontenac continued 
in this state even after Comte de Frontenac died, its use as a military garrison was 
drastically reduced in the following decades until the British destroyed it in 1758. 
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Conclusion 
Fort Frontenac’s shifting status as venerated royal fort and economic drain 
illustrates that administrative assessments of colonial projects were rarely static. The fort’s 
value in the eyes of the King and French Court mirrored their opinions of Governor 
Frontenac. Although initially proposed as a key military structure and centre for legitimate 
trade, Fort Frontenac operated as a sanctuary for illicit trade for most of its existence. The 
fort’s involvement in illegal trade was known to most of the officials who hoped to 
legitimize operations at the fort, such as Governor Denonville and Intendant Champigny. 
Fort Frontenac provides a case study of some of the political rivalries and imperial issues 
facing New France, which were ultimately tied to the illicit fur trade. It highlights the 
questionable conduct of administrators, namely Governor Frontenac and his inner circle, 
including men like La Salle. The fort also shows how difficult it was to stop or even hinder 
illicit trade. The problems of administrative corruption and rampant illicit trade at Fort 
Frontenac mirrored those that plagued New France during this period.  
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Conclusion 
From its inception as a royal colony in 1663, New France relied on the fur trade as a 
key driver of the economy.344 The illicit fur trade, particularly that which operated through 
Indigenous traders and coureurs de bois, existed concurrently with its legal counterpart.345 
The proliferation of an unsanctioned clandestine trade was a hindrance to New France’s 
economic viability.346 This thesis argues that the illicit fur trade in New France between 
1663 and 1740 contributed to the political deterioration of colonial administration. The 
presence of coureurs de bois, and the way that they undermined New France’s trade 
economy by circumventing official channels could not be ignored. Coureurs de bois 
demanded administrative attention if government officials wanted to realize the Crown’s 
goal of economic self-sustainability and population growth. Ultimately, difficulties in 
punishing and bringing coureurs de bois to justice undermined the authority of the Crown 
in New France. In addition, disagreements over the proper way to deal with coureurs de 
bois fueled rivalries within the administration. Governor Frontenac and Intendant 
Duchesneau were at the forefront of these rivalries. Finally, Fort Frontenac shows another 
layer to the administrative rivalries. There were frequent disagreements about Fort 
Frontenac’s usefulness throughout the fort’s existence. Those who advocated for Fort 
Frontenac, such as La Salle and Governor Frontenac himself, believed that illicit trade out of 
the fort helped to uphold French interests, like New France’s Indigenous diplomacy policy. 
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Officials like Intendant Duchesneau, who opposed maintaining Fort Frontenac, saw its 
relationship to illicit trade as antithetical to France’s imperial and economic aims in North 
America. 
This study has examined the social, political, and criminal structure of the historical 
colony of New France, as well as contributed a commentary of illicit activities on a broader 
scale. I have argued that sponsorship of the illicit fur trade from commoners and 
government officials allowed it to continue; through this lens, we attain a better 
understanding of some of the reasons why criminal activities continued in the face of state-
sanctioned efforts to curb them.347 Similarly, connections between criminal elements, the 
general populace, and government officials speak to larger issues of dealing with 
criminality.348 Along with administrative disagreements and political disunity, public 
support for coureurs de bois was a persistent issue in curbing illicit trade and bringing 
coureurs de bois to justice. 
There were few changes throughout this period regarding royal policy towards 
coureurs de bois, so any significant change has been difficult to track. However, I have 
attempted to trace how the attitudes of various New France administrators towards illicit 
trade did change, which was an important indicator for the status of coureurs de bois in the 
colony. Similarly, certain events had a propensity to influence how the illicit fur trade was 
perceived by the French administration. In cases of global conflicts, like the War of the 
Spanish Succession or the War of the Austrian Succession, the illicit fur trade essentially 
                                                          
347 Scalberg, “The French-Amerindian Religious Encounter,” 103. 
348 Kwass, Contraband, 8-9. Michael Kwass argues that dealing with rising illicit markets was not as easy as 
one might expect, as they typically grew alongside the growth of larger global markets – something that was 
on the rise in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
  96  
 
had to be ignored by colonial officials. Overall there is a sense that specific attitudes and 
actions towards the illicit fur trade may have changed among New France administrators, 
but a lasting change in policy never truly occurred. 
A diverse range of peoples and nations fought for supremacy of the lands that would 
become Canada and the United States. Understanding why New France failed to achieve the 
goals laid out by men like Jean-Baptiste Colbert is important in following the trajectory of 
North American geopolitical development. The British Empire proved to be more 
successful in creating settlement colonies, whereas France continually had trouble in 
projecting its imperial vision in New France and making it a reality.349 Where Great Britain 
could rely on its colonies to support themselves through permanent settlement and 
intercolonial trade, New France had difficulty attracting settlers from France and had more 
limited intercolonial trade. Natural increase helped to stabilize the small colonial settler 
population of New France, but economically the colony slipped into reliance on a trade-
based model with the fur trade as one of the driving engines.350 Since trade, diplomacy, and 
defence were invariable linked, and economic self-sufficiency a primary imperial goal, the 
disruptive power of coureurs de bois and the illicit fur trade played a crucial role in 
weakening the French empire in North America. 
In many ways coureurs de bois form an archetypical frontier people in how they 
conducted their illicit trade in commercial centres and then slipped into the backcountry to 
avoid persecution. While I have argued that not everything that the coureurs de bois did 
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was clandestine, the very nature of their vocation was covert. We can use them as a lens 
through which to gain a more comprehensive picture of peripheral peoples, what they 
meant to the world around them, and how they contributed to the formation of the modern 
world. We see the role that geography plays in criminal activity; the mutable borders and 
hinterland zones of New France – particularly areas like the pays d’en haut – helped 
peripheral peoples such as coureurs de bois to evade state control.351 It is for this reason 
that an individual coureur de bois should not simply be considered, “an Indian with a white 
man’s mind,” but rather, we should take them as a group and acknowledge them as 
Intendant Jean Talon did, that they were, “...masters of their own actions and the 
implementation of their own wills.”352  
If there is one final note to take away from this analysis, it is that there is something 
to learn from peoples like coureurs de bois who evaded state-control, and who are therefore 
largely silent in the historical record. Through analyzing what colonial authorities within 
New France had to say about coureurs de bois and the illicit fur trade, I have uncovered that 
their role in the French colonial economy was much more nuanced. They could be a 
hindrance to legitimate, state-sponsored fur trading, but the protection they got from 
persecution, and their propensity to cause rifts in the administration, adds another 
dimension to the coureur de bois as historical subject. It is in this added dimension that 
coureurs de bois have value for continued study, and how they can continue to figure into 
                                                          
351 Scott, The Art of Not Being Governed, 3, 5, 20. 
352 DeVoto, The Course of Empire, 103; BAnQ, Ordonnances, Commissions, Etc, Etc, des Gouverneurs et 
Intendants, NF 1639-1706, “Ordonnance de M. Talon qui défend aux habitants de quitter leaurs demeures 
pour courir les bois et faire la traite avec les sauvages sous peine de punition corporelle,” June 5, 1672, 107. 
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larger discussions of society’s relationship to the underground, and how that relationship 
shapes society as a whole. 
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